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REGULATING HABIT-FORMING TECHNOLOGY 
Kyle Langvardt* 
 
Tech developers, like slot machine designers, strive to maximize the user’s 
“time on device.”  They do so by designing habit-forming products—
products that draw consciously on the same behavioral design strategies that 
the casino industry pioneered.  The predictable result is that most tech users 
spend more time on device than they would like, about five hours of phone 
time a day, while a substantial minority develop life-changing behavioral 
problems similar to problem gambling. 
Other countries have begun to regulate habit-forming tech, and American 
jurisdictions may soon follow suit.  Several state legislatures today are 
considering bills to regulate “loot boxes,” a highly addictive slot-machine-
like mechanic that is common in online video games.  The Federal Trade 
Commission has also announced an investigation into the practice.  As public 
concern mounts, it is surprisingly easy to envision consumer regulation 
extending beyond video games to other types of apps.  Just as tobacco 
regulations might prohibit brightly colored packaging and fruity flavors, a 
social media regulation might limit the use of red notification badges or 
“streaks” that reward users for daily use. 
It is unclear how much of this regulation could survive First Amendment 
scrutiny; software, unlike other consumer products, is widely understood as 
a form of protected “expression.”  But it is also unclear whether well-drawn 
laws to combat compulsive technology use would seriously threaten First 
Amendment values.  At a very low cost to the expressive interests of tech 
companies, these laws may well enhance the quality and efficacy of online 
speech by mitigating distraction and promoting deliberation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Tech products from Facebook to Candy Crush apply well-tested 
behavioral techniques to make their products as habit-forming as possible.  
Industry gurus, until recently, bragged openly about these practices in 
industry bestsellers with titles like Hooked:  How to Build Habit-Forming 
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Products1 and Evil by Design.2  A tech consultancy called Dopamine Labs 
went so far as to advertise that:  “Dopamine makes your app addictive.  Lift 
your engagement and revenue up to 167% by giving your users our perfect 
[hits] of dopamine. . . .  High ROI.  PhD tested, CEO approved.”3 
These efforts appear to have paid off.  One recent study discovered that 
average Americans use their smartphones 76 times a day and touch their 
phones 2617 times per day.4  Among young adults, five hours of phone use 
a day is typical.5  And in 2018, the World Health Organization (WHO) took 
an unprecedented step by including “gaming disorder,” a behavioral 
addiction, among its International Classification of Diseases.6 
Regulators have begun to pay attention.  Washington State’s gambling 
laws have been interpreted to cover certain casino-themed mobile games.7  
Congress and several state legislatures are exploring legislation to restrict the 
use of “loot boxes,”8 a de facto slot machine that drives revenue in video 
games,9 and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has promised to 
 
 1. NIR EYAL WITH RYAN HOOVER, HOOKED:  HOW TO BUILD HABIT-FORMING PRODUCTS 
(2014). 
 2. CHRIS NODDER, EVIL BY DESIGN:  INTERACTION DESIGN TO LEAD US INTO TEMPTATION 
(2013). 
 3. Jonathan Shieber, Meet the Tech Company That Wants to Make You Even More 
Addicted to Your Phone, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 8, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/ 
09/08/meet-the-tech-company-that-wants-to-make-you-even-more-addicted-to-your-phone/ 
[https://perma.cc/LS2A-NGZJ]. 
 4. Michael Winnick, Putting a Finger on Our Phone Obsession, DSCOUT (June 16, 2016), 
https://blog.dscout.com/mobile-touches [https://perma.cc/6GKR-ZFPU]. 
 5. Carolyn Gregoire, You Probably Use Your Smartphone Way More Than You Think, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 2, 2015, 4:13 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ 
smartphone-usage-estimates_us_5637687de4b063179912dc96 [https://perma.cc/L5HA-
SWRQ]. 
 6. The WHO defines “gaming disorder” as a “pattern of gaming behavior (‘digital-
gaming’ or ‘video-gaming’) characterized by impaired control over gaming, increasing 
priority given to gaming over other activities to the extent that gaming takes precedence over 
other interests and daily activities, and continuation or escalation of gaming despite the 
occurrence of negative consequences.” Gaming Disorder, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Sept. 2018), 
https://www.who.int/features/qa/gaming-disorder/en/ [https://perma.cc/4P6D-UPQZ]. 
 7. Kater v. Churchill Downs Inc., 886 F.3d 784, 785 (9th Cir. 2018).  Other states’ 
gambling laws, however, have been interpreted more narrowly. See generally Mason v. Mach. 
Zone, Inc., 851 F.3d 315, 319–20 (4th Cir. 2017) (applying Maryland law); Phillips v. Double 
Down Interactive LLC, 173 F. Supp. 3d 731, 737–39 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (applying Illinois law); 
Soto v. Sky Union, LLC, 159 F. Supp. 3d 871, 877–81 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (applying California 
law). 
 8. See, e.g., Press Release, Josh Hawley, U.S. Senator, Senator Hawley to Introduce 
Legislation Banning Manipulative Video Game Features Aimed at Children (May 8, 2019), 
https://www.hawley.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2019-05/2019-05-08_Video-Game-
Bill_One-Pager_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/RVX4-PXTD]; see also Assemb. 2194, 2017–2018 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); S. 3024, 29th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2018); H.R. 2727, 29th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2018); H.R. 2686, 29th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2018); H.R. 4460, 90th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2018).  Other bills have called for investigations into the practice by 
gambling and law enforcement authorities. See, e.g., S. 333, 120th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. 
Sess. (Ind. 2018); S. 6266, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018). 
 9. See infra Part II.A.3. 
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investigate that same practice.10  International regulators have gone further, 
with South Korea requiring online gaming platforms to deter extended play 
and to kick minors off after midnight.11 
In principle, these efforts might someday extend beyond gaming to a much 
wider world of habit-forming technology.  A growing number of tech insiders 
have expressed strong reservations about social media’s addictive potential, 
with some calling for the industry to be regulated “like tobacco or alcohol.”12  
It is easy to imagine a legislative push to protect minors, at least, from tech 
products that are understood to encourage compulsive use.  And as tech 
products become more sophisticated and intrusive, we may eventually see 
calls to protect adults from certain aggressive forms of behavioral 
manipulation. 
This Article outlines the various forms that these regulatory interventions 
might take.  These include light-touch, limited-range policies that are already 
under official consideration in American jurisdictions.13  They also include 
aggressive policies that seem unthinkable today, but that over the long-term 
may appear proportionate as tech companies become more sophisticated at 
manipulating user behavior.14 
Even the more modest policies will raise quick constitutional challenges if 
enacted.  Social media,15 video games,16 and even computer code itself17 
have received First Amendment protection in past case law.  One might 
 
 10. Brian Crecente, Federal Trade Commission Chairman Pledges to Investigate Video 
Game Loot Boxes, VARIETY (Nov. 27, 2018, 3:01 PM), https://variety.com/2018/gaming/ 
news/ftc-loot-box-investigation-1203038178/ [https://perma.cc/23C3-YBQ3]. 
 11. See Sohn Ji-Young, WHO’s Labeling of Gaming Addiction as a Disorder Sparks 
Concern in Korea, JAKARTA POST (Jan. 4, 2018, 2:01 PM), https:// 
www.thejakartapost.com/life/2018/01/04/whos-labeling-of-gaming-addiction-as-a-disorder-
sparks-concern-in-korea.html [https://perma.cc/ZZP8-LGG8]; Carolyn Sun, South Korea’s 
Video Game Addiction, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 17, 2011, 1:00 AM), https:// www.newsweek.com/ 
south-koreas-video-game-addiction-68309 [https://perma.cc/Y2CR-5R8X].  South Korea’s 
online gaming platforms must screen users by requiring them to submit a national ID number. 
Huu Kim Le, Internet Gaming Shutdown Law aka “Cinderella Curfew,” CGI CLINIC (July 18, 
2015), https://cgiclinic.com/south-korea-special-shutdown-law-aka-cinderella-curfew/ 
[https://perma.cc/3HHF-Z5ET]. 
 12. Alex Hern, Facebook Should Be “Regulated Like Cigarette Industry,” Says Tech 
CEO, GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2018, 7:32 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/ 
jan/24/facebook-regulated-cigarette-industry-salesforce-marc-benioff-social-media 
[https://perma.cc/RQ34-GLGN] (“[T]echnology has addictive qualities that we have to 
address, and that product designers are working to make those products more addictive, and 
we need to rein that back as much as possible.” (quoting Marc Benioff, chief executive officer 
of Salesforce)); Roger McNamee, Why Not Regulate Social Media Like Tobacco or Alcohol?, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2018, 4:32 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2018/jan/ 
29/social-media-tobacco-facebook-google [https://perma.cc/P6BG-Q9CN]. 
 13. See infra Parts II.A.1, II.A.3 (proposing labeling strategies and bans on video game 
“loot boxes”). 
 14. See infra Part II.A.4 (proposing mandatory design features to slow down and de-
intensify the user experience). 
 15. See, e.g., Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017). 
 16. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011). 
 17. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 446–52 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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assume from this record that even the most modest attempts to regulate habit-
forming design should fail First Amendment scrutiny. 
Instead, the question is wide open—courts have hardly begun to address 
the First Amendment status of software’s technical and nonexpressive 
components.  Is the choice to use an “infinite scroll” in the Facebook News 
Feed a form of “speech”?  What about Twitter’s strategic deployment of a 
“loading” wheel to build anticipation after a Twitter user “pulls to refresh”?  
And if they are speech, then how should courts balance the equities?  It is 
forbidden to burden speech on the basis that the speech is too persuasive.18  
Is it any better to burden habit-forming design—sometimes called 
“persuasive technology”19—because it succeeds in building user habits? 
Courts’ answers to these questions will carry heavy consequences for 
media policy at large.  On the one hand, most free content online is monetized 
by a huge behavioral advertising ecosystem that includes Google, Facebook, 
and scattered smaller advertising networks.20  The business model requires 
enormous amounts of data, which in turn requires users to spend enormous 
amounts of time on their devices.  Policies that cut into that time may improve 
users’ health while impairing their access to information. 
On the other hand, the addiction-driven nature of social media probably 
harms the quality of public discourse and deliberation.  First, developers’ 
efforts to drive constant user engagement encourage an emotional, hair-
trigger style of public expression.21  Second, by training users to respond to 
stimuli out of habit rather than by considered choice, social media engineers 
prime the public discussion for manipulation by “trolls” and saboteurs.22  A 
 
 18. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 578 (2011) (“That the State finds 
expression too persuasive does not permit it to quiet the speech or to burden its messengers.”). 
 19. See, e.g., B.J. FOGG, PERSUASIVE TECHNOLOGY:  USING COMPUTERS TO CHANGE WHAT 
WE THINK AND DO 1 (2003) (defining “persuasive technology” as “any interactive computing 
system designed to change people’s attitudes or behaviors”). 
 20. See infra Part I.B. 
 21. See M. J. Crockett, Moral Outrage in the Digital Age, 1 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 769, 
769 (2017); Maksym Gabielkov et al., Social Clicks:  What and Who Gets Read on Twitter?, 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REV., June 2016, at 179, 182 (reporting that “a majority (59%) of 
the URLs mentioned on Twitter are not clicked at all”); Michela Del Vicario et al., Echo 
Chambers:  Emotional Contagion and Group Polarization on Facebook, SCI. REP. 8–9 (Dec. 
1, 2016), https://www.nature.com/articles/srep37825.pdf [https://perma.cc/BM9U-DRHY] 
(demonstrating that users on Facebook tend to organize into echo chambers where higher 
involvement produces more negative emotion); Rui Fan et al., Anger Is More Influential Than 
Joy:  Sentiment Correlation in Weibo, PLOS ONE (Oct. 15, 2014), http://journals.plos.org/ 
plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0110184 [https://perma.cc/RN8E-FHP6] (finding 
that connected users of Weibo, a Twitter-like platform in China, share significantly more 
sentiment correlation along lines of anger than of joy or sadness). 
 22. See DIPAYAN GHOSH & BEN SCOTT, NEW AM., #DIGITALDECEIT:  THE TECHNOLOGIES 
BEHIND PRECISION PROPAGANDA ON THE INTERNET 17 (2018); Craig Timberg & Elizabeth 
Dwoskin, Russians Got Tens of Thousands of Americans to RSVP for Their Phony Political 
Events on Facebook, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/the-switch/wp/2018/01/25/russians-got-tens-of-thousands-of-americans-to-rsvp-for-
their-phony-political-events-on-facebook/ [https://perma.cc/392P-9Q3G]. 
134 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
population better able to resist its news and social media interfaces may well 
produce a political culture that is hardier and more stable.23 
Part I discusses the economic incentives that have made addictive design 
such a pervasive phenomenon in the tech world.  Then, it briefly discusses 
some techniques that tech designers use to encourage habit formation, along 
with the harms, both mundane and profound, that these habits cause.  Part II 
lays out the prospects for regulation: what the range of possible strategies 
would be and which institutions may be equipped to implement some of 
them.  Part III turns to a broad discussion of the First Amendment 
considerations. 
I.  THE RISE OF HABIT-FORMING DESIGN 
A.  Why Drive Compulsive Use? 
Over the past twenty years or so, consumers have come to expect low 
prices—and more often no price at all—for most of the software and media 
they consume online.  This is basic economics:  the internet has reduced the 
marginal cost of distributing (and copying) content to practically zero, and 
prices have followed close behind. 
Zero-price markets force content producers and distributors to extract 
value from users in ways that do not offend the zero-price expectation up 
front.24  Most firms have two options:  micropayments and advertising.  
These techniques make up for a lack of up-front payment by collecting value 
over a long and limitless series of consumer interactions.  Hence the 
obsession at companies like Facebook and Twitter with “driving 
engagement”—more interactions lead to more user “engagement,” which 
leads to more value the firm stands to capture.25 
 
 23. Hunt Allcott et al., The Welfare Effects of Social Media 20–22 (Stanford Inst. for Econ. 
Policy Research, Working Paper No. 19-002, 2019), https://siepr.stanford.edu/sites/default/ 
files/publications/19-002.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RVR-LMX7] (finding that study subjects 
who quit Facebook for one month indicated less attention and knowledge of news but also 
demonstrated less political polarization). 
 24. Rafet Sifa et al., Profiling in Games:  Understanding Behavior from Telemetry, in 
SOCIAL INTERACTION IN VIRTUAL WORLDS 337, 345 (Kiran Lakkarahu et al. eds., 2018) (“The 
rise of F2P games has notably added to the industry’s focus on behavior analysis.  These are 
games with no up-front cost to the customer, with revenue depending on In-App Purchases 
(IAPs) (and sometimes associated branded products).  Revenue is thus dependent on the ability 
of the developer to convince some portion of the customer base to purchase virtual items for 
real money.  In order to be successful as a business model, these games require continued 
analysis of player behavior . . . .). 
 25. See The State of Intellectual Freedom in America:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
the Constitution & Civil Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 6 (2018) 
(statement of Ari Ezra Waldman, Director, Innovation Center for Law and Technology, New 
York Law School) (“The more we like, the more we comment, the more pictures we upload, 
and the more we simply browse the internet, the more Facebook knows about us, . . . and the 
more money it can charge those who want to target us for advertisements.”); SIVA 
VAIDHYANATHAN, ANTI-SOCIAL MEDIA:  HOW FACEBOOK DISCONNECTS US AND UNDERMINES 
DEMOCRACY 56–62 (2018) (describing Facebook’s data-driven advertising model). 
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In the casino industry—another sector where few would pay up front for 
what they get at the end of the day26—the imperative to drive the slot 
machine gambler’s engagement for hours on end has a more straightforward 
name:  “time on device.”27 
1.  Time on Device:  The Advertising Model 
Advertising is a time-worn technique for drawing in revenue without 
charging a high price to the customer.  The newspaper and magazine 
industries collect most of their revenue from advertisers, and broadcasters 
depend on them.28  The concept today is ultimately the same as in the mid-
nineteenth century when the “penny presses” invented it:  content producers 
draw consumers’ attention and “sell” their ad exposure to the merchant.29 
Advertising-based business models have always valued “time on device,” 
whether the device is a television or a magazine.  Twentieth-century mass 
media strove to keep viewers’ and listeners’ attention through cliff-hangers, 
promotions, call-in contests, and the like.30  Advertisers targeted audiences 
demographically.  TV networks would use soap operas to drive demand for 
soap and other household products that women of the day were more likely 
to purchase.31  Rolling Stone magazine, at least in its early days, ran 
advertisements aimed at young adults.32 
Today’s online advertising industry has grown much more sophisticated.  
Modern ad networks target individuals based on real-time behavioral 
profiling.33  In many cases, ad networks monitor the individual’s response to 
 
 26. See Slot Machine Payback Statistics, AM. CASINO GUIDE, 
https://www.americancasinoguide.com/slot-machine-payback-statistics.html 
[https://perma.cc/YLT2-7YE6] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019) (showing that slot machines 
around the country have 85 to 97 percent rates of return per pull). 
 27. Brad Plumer, Slot-Machine Science:  How Casinos Get You to Spend More Money, 
VOX (Mar. 1, 2015, 6:27 AM), https://www.vox.com/2014/8/7/5976927/slot-machines-
casinos-addiction-by-design [https://perma.cc/P44F-T9ZU]. 
 28. See generally Newspapers Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (June 13, 2018), 
https://www.journalism.org/fact-sheet/newspapers/ [https://perma.cc/PX6X-UDLB]; Matt 
Stieb, One Company Is Making Money from News and It Rhymes with ‘Shmoogle,’ N.Y. MAG. 
(June 9, 2019), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/06/google-posts-usd4-7-billion-profit-
in-2018-from-news-industry.html [https://perma.cc/Y7C6-N5T9]. 
 29. See Sonja R. West, The “Press,” Then & Now, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 49, 93 (2016). 
 30. See Emily Nussbaum, Tune in Next Week:  The Curious Staying Power of the 
Cliffhanger, NEW YORKER (July 22, 2012), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/07/ 
30/tune-in-next-week [https://perma.cc/4XE7-5AAM]. 
 31. Soap Opera, AD AGE (Sept. 15, 2003), https://adage.com/article/adage-
encyclopedia/soap-opera/98883/ [https://perma.cc/F9GM-BHGR]. 
 32. Nick Ravo, Rolling Stone Turns a Prosperous 20, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 1987), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/23/business/rolling-stone-turns-a-prosperous-20.html 
[https://perma.cc/76PU-UUUV]. 
 33. See Adknowledge Rolls Out Enhanced Behavioral Targeting Model to Increase 
Advertiser Conversions, BUS. WIRE (July 24, 2007), https://www.globenewswire.com/news-
release/2007/07/24/1050231/0/en/Adknowledge-Rolls-Out-Enhanced-Behavioral-Targeting-
Model-to-Increase-Advertiser-Conversions.html [https://perma.cc/KBZ5-WEZB] 
(“Adknowledge, a CPC auction-style ad network, analyzes behavioral data in real time, 
uncovering interest and response patterns to deliver targeted advertisements more likely to 
match consumer preferences.”); Following $6m Investment, SALESmanago Brings Next Gen 
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an ad:  Did the individual follow through by visiting the merchant’s website, 
viewing the advertised items, putting the item in a “cart” or a “save for later” 
list, or consummating the purchase?34 
This fine-grained control over consumer behavior vastly improves the 
“yield” of an online ad placement,35 and it has to.  Many web users use ad-
blockers.36  Users who do not use ad-blockers are not generally inclined to 
click; studies have demonstrated that internet ads are among the least 
effective forms of advertising.37  And if nobody clicks, then advertisers must 
strive harder to put “relevant” ads in front of consumers. 
 
Marketing Automation to eCommerce & B2C, PR NEWSWIRE (June 6, 2016, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/following-6m-investment-salesmanago-brings-
next-gen-marketing-automation-to-ecommerce--b2c-300279516.html [https://perma.cc/ 
D2N6-WP5J] (“The complete individual profiles of customers with such behavioral and 
transactional data are then used in real time to build automatic predictive offers that are 
delivered individually in all marketing channels . . . .”); Michael Learmonth, Search-Titan 
Google Makes Display Play with ROI Tool:  Campaign Insights Aims to Give Click King 
Bigger Share of $4.7B Business, AD AGE (Oct. 19, 2009), https://adage.com/article/ 
digital/google-search-titan-makes-display-play-roi-tool/139756 [https://perma.cc/BBA4-
PY4Q] (describing Google’s “Campaign Insights” program, which relies on automated A/B 
testing to determine what kinds of ad displays prompt users to search for a brand or product); 
Proving There Is More to Location Targeting in Mobile, xAd Launches Proprietary 
SmartFencing™, SmartLocation™ Technologies, BUS. WIRE (Nov. 8, 2012, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20121108005317/en/Proving-Location-
Targeting-Mobile-xAd-Launches-Proprietary [https://perma.cc/NZB3-6L2U] (“xAd’s local 
search and display ad network reaches over 85 million mobile consumers each month and is 
the only network with the ability to not only ensure accurate local targeting—but enhance it 
through the use of real-time and historical local search behaviors and other available data 
variables.”). 
 34. Tim Peterson, Google Tool Can Calculate What That Mobile Ad Is Really Worth, 
ADWEEK (Mar. 26, 2013), https://www.adweek.com/digital/google-tool-can-calculate-what-
mobile-ad-really-worth-148155/ [https://perma.cc/2TEC-N29M].  This progression of steps 
toward a final transaction is called a “conversion funnel.” Id.  Data analytics tools help 
merchants to optimize it by locating at which point in the funnel consumers are jumping out 
and then fixing the “leak.” See Create and Manage Funnels, FACEBOOK ANALYTICS, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/analytics/935921203105136 [https://perma.cc/AKU4-
9TTE] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
 35. See HOWARD BEALES, THE VALUE OF BEHAVIORAL TARGETING 3 (2009), https:// 
www.networkadvertising.org/pdfs/Beales_NAI_Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5AX-CRLR] 
(showing behaviorally targeted advertising has over twice the clickthrough rate of “run-of-
network” advertising, and significantly greater conversions).  Some critics have dismissed this 
account as “investor storytime,” arguing that ad networks excel not at driving sales but at 
showing ads to people who are just about to make a purchase anyway. See Ethan Zuckerman, 
The Internet’s Original Sin, ATLANTIC (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
technology/archive/2014/08/advertising-is-the-internets-original-sin/376041/ 
[https://perma.cc/NFH7-KVZV?type=image].  But note that in either case, the incentive to 
drive compulsive engagement is the same. 
 36. Lauren Johnson, IAB Study Says 26% of Desktop Users Turn On Ad Blockers, 
ADWEEK (July 26, 2016), https://www.adweek.com/digital/iab-study-says-26-desktop-users-
turn-ad-blockers-172665/ [https://perma.cc/2MYC-8SXB]. 
 37. Derek Thompson, A Dangerous Question:  Does Internet Advertising Work At All?, 
ATLANTIC (June 13, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/06/a-
dangerous-question-does-internet-advertising-work-at-all/372704/ [https://perma.cc/NHF9-
NPMT]. 
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Today’s advertisers therefore have two reasons to drive time on device.  
First, the user must be exposed to as many ads as possible.  The more time 
on device, the more ad exposures.  The second requirement—one that 
emerged in the internet era—is to target the ads as closely as possible to the 
individual user.  This targeting requires advertisers to collect as much data as 
possible about the user—not only demographic data, but minute-by-minute 
data about the user’s location, mood, and desires.38  The more time on device, 
the richer the dossier. 
Behaviorally targeted advertising underwrites free online media on the 
web and in apps.  Facebook and Google run the largest advertising networks, 
tracking user behavior and using the data to place ads on their own sites and 
across the web.39  They may also buy or otherwise obtain data from other 
sources, such as brick-and-mortar customer reward programs,40 credit 
bureaus,41 or from other app developers who collect data for the purpose of 
selling it.42 
Advertisers pay Facebook, Google, and the other ad networks to place ads, 
and the ad networks split this payment with the owners of the website or app 
where the ad is placed.  Everyone’s revenue stream—that of the content 
producers, app developers, and social and search platforms that place ads—
depends on maximizing time on device. 
2.  The Microtransactions Model 
Only a few years ago, the video game industry captured most of its revenue 
at the point of sale.  Gamers might purchase a game in the store on a physical 
medium, or they might pay up front for a downloadable copy from an online 
gaming platform, often after having the chance to play through the beginning 
 
 38. See Kurt Wagner, This Is How Facebook Uses Your Data for Ad Targeting, VOX (Apr. 
11, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/11/17177842/facebook-advertising-ads-
explained-mark-zuckerberg [https://perma.cc/5L6V-32YX]. 
 39. See Nathan Ingraham, Facebook Buys Data on Users’ Offline Habits for Better Ads, 
ENGADGET (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.engadget.com/2016/12/30/facebook-buys-data-on-
users-offline-habits-for-better-ads/ [https://perma.cc/LG76-XUDR]. 
 40. Brick-and-mortar retailers can use an automated process, Facebook’s Offline 
Conversions API, to pair their own point-of-sale data on a person with Facebook’s 
geolocational and other data on the same person.  Facebook can then provide the retailer with 
a “lookalike” audience of potential buyers who might be susceptible to similar marketing 
strategies. See Thorin Klosowski, How Facebook Uses Your Data to Target Ads, Even Offline, 
LIFEHACKER (Apr. 11, 2013, 11:00 AM), https://lifehacker.com/5994380/how-facebook-uses-
your-data-to-target-ads-even-offline [https://perma.cc/9FQK-4AS2]; Tim Peterson, Facebook 
Will Target Ads to People Based on Store Visits, Offline Purchases, Calls to Businesses, 
MARKETING LAND (Sept. 21, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://marketingland.com/facebook-will-
target-ads-people-based-store-visits-offline-purchases-calls-businesses-224668 
[https://perma.cc/4AAN-2QFX]. 
 41. Ingraham, supra note 39 (listing Experian and TransUnion as U.S. data partners with 
Facebook). 
 42. Julia Angwin et al., Facebook Doesn’t Tell Users Everything It Really Knows About 
Them, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 27, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-
doesnt-tell-users-everything-it-really-knows-about-them [https://perma.cc/7Q66-LK2U]. 
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part of the game—a “demo”—for free.43  For the most part, this business 
model continued the straightforward retail model for books and other 
physical media that held through the twentieth century.  Prices for console 
cartridge video games in the 1990s ran from roughly $60 to $80 in 2019-
adjusted terms.44 
Similar products at similar price points continue to exist for traditional 
gamers who are willing to pay up front for serious console or PC games—
2018’s Red Dead Redemption 2, for instance, a big-budget production that 
sells for nearly $60.45  A new category of casual mobile gamers has emerged 
as well.  Light “free-to-play” (F2P) games now make up most of the market.46  
Rather than charging up front, these games’ developers monetize their 
products mostly through in-app purchases or advertising.47  In principle, they 
could sell in-game behavioral data to third-party advertising networks as 
well, though it is unclear whether such a market has emerged.48 
There is a clear need for F2P casual games to maximize user engagement.  
A banner ad in a video game will typically pull only about $2 or $3 per 
thousand user impressions.49  Making any significant amount of money from 
ad impressions requires users to spend massive amounts of time on the game, 
and even then, an ad-based strategy may not always be lucrative. 
Most of the gaming sector has therefore moved to a hybrid monetization 
model that rests at least partially on in-app “micropayments” from players—
small fees that players spend over time to gain small in-game advantages.50  
 
 43. See generally Patrick Klepek, The Real Stories Behind E3’s Glossy Game Demos, 
KOTAKU (June 10, 2016, 3:28 PM), https://kotaku.com/the-real-stories-behind-e3-s-glossy-
game-demos-1710169104 [https://perma.cc/KFP2-34JB]. 
 44. Kyle Orland & Jonathan Gitlin, Why Retail Console Games Have Never Been 
Cheaper, Historically, ARS TECHNICA (June 30, 2013, 4:00 PM), https://arstechnica.com/ 
gaming/2013/06/why-retail-console-games-have-never-been-cheaper-historically/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZW49-P5LK]. 
 45. Red Dead Redemption 2—PlayStation 4, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/Red-
Dead-Redemption-2-PlayStation-4/dp/B01M5DZ525?th=1 [https://perma.cc/PS27-DH95] 
(last visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
 46. TTT, The Future of Gaming:  How Micro-Transactions Are Disrupting the Industry, 
MEDIUM (Aug. 20, 2018), https://medium.com/trustnote/the-future-of-gaming-how-
microtransactions-are-disrupting-the-industry-c7f5bab1081b [https://perma.cc/WE2T-
RN6U]. 
 47. “Reward-based monetization,” a third strategy, is arguably distinct from advertising 
and in-app purchases, but the differences are irrelevant for purposes of this Article.  Under 
this strategy, developers dispense in-game rewards to players who complete some action that 
is valuable to a paying merchant.  These actions include installing a separate app, watching a 
video ad, or completing a survey. See Michael Sprague, New Study:  The Data Behind Reward-
Based Monetization in F2P Games, MEDIUM (May 31, 2016), https://medium.com/ 
tapresearch/new-study-the-data-behind-reward-based-monetization-in-f2p-games-
66bb31d3ac7e [https://perma.cc/88GU-HGLF]. 
 48. See generally Sifa et al., supra note 24, at 350. 
 49. Yaniv Nizan, 42 Ways to Monetize Your Mobile Game, GAMEANALYTICS (Oct. 9, 
2013), https://gameanalytics.com/blog/42-ways-to-monetize-your-mobile-game.html [https:// 
perma.cc/R6EW-FS43]. 
 50. See Andrei Klubnikin, Microtransactions in Games:  The Good, the Bad, and the 
Ugly, GAMEANALYTICS (Feb. 14, 2018), https://gameanalytics.com/blog/microtransactions-
games-good-bad-ugly.html [https://perma.cc/HFT5-Y6PS]; see also SWRVE, MONETIZATION 
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F2P games lean heavily on micropayments, and certain big-budget traditional 
games do as well, typically as a means to lower the retail price.51  In recent 
years, the video game industry has captured most of its overall revenue from 
these post-sale or post-download micropayments.52 
The usual approach is to allow the user to play for a few minutes or even 
a few days without any kind of sales pitch.53  Then some goal is dangled in 
front of the player, such as the chance to win a new in-game item or to 
upgrade the player’s character.54  Achieving the goal usually requires the 
player to cash in some significant amount of in-game currency that can be 
either purchased with cash or earned through time on device.55  The latter 
option may require hours of tedious work from the player,56 and the game is 
often designed to make it impossible to get this work done in one sitting.57  
The user is only allowed to play for ten minutes or so at a time, for example, 
 
REPORT 2016 6 (2016), https://www.swrve.com/images/uploads/whitepapers/swrve-
monetization-report-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5W5-AUMR] (showing that 73.5 percent 
of mobile in-app purchases range from $0 to $10). 
 51. See Sifa et al., supra note 24, at 345; see also Ben Lindbergh, Battlefront, Reddit:  The 
Video Game Pricing Wars That Might Reshape the Industry, RINGER (Dec. 2, 2017, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.theringer.com/features/2017/12/2/16725196/reddit-fighting-microtransaction-
exploitation-in-video-games [https://perma.cc/HT8J-5VRN] (“Rather than raise the sticker 
price and scare away customers on the front end, publishers are, logically enough, opting to 
tack on costs post-purchase, via paid downloadable content, ‘season passes’ that grant access 
to all future DLC, and, more problematically, microtransactions.”). 
 52. See Rob Thubron, Microtransactions from Free-to-Play Games Almost Three Times 
the Revenue of Paid Game Releases, TECHSPOT (Nov. 30, 2017, 6:15 AM), https:// 
www.techspot.com/news/72104-microtransactions-ftp-pc-games-generate-22-billion-
2017.html [https://perma.cc/9F7W-YYNY]; TTT, supra note 46 (showing that 82 percent of 
game revenue in 2017 came from F2P games containing in-app purchases). 
 53. See, e.g., Damion Schubert, Respecting the Player’s Wallet, GAMASUTRA (Apr. 29, 
2013), https://www.gamasutra.com/view/news/191264/Respecting_the_players_wallet.php 
[https://perma.cc/Q68N-DD97] (noting that in Star Wars:  The Old Republic, “[p]layers are 
rarely, if ever, prompted to spend money in the first 10 levels, and the player is likely to forget 
that doing so is even possible”). 
 54. On June 12, 2019, the author played through the opening stages of Candy Crush Saga 
and Minion Rush.  In Candy Crush Saga, the player runs out of moves and is then given the 
opportunity to keep playing using “gold bars” and a “Piggy Bank” purchasable for $2.99.  In 
Minion Rush, apparently a children’s game, the player is eventually introduced to a set of slot-
machine-like “prize pods” and character upgrades called “costumes” that can be purchased 
through a set of in-game currencies.  Revives and prize pods can also be earned by watching 
a video advertisement. 
 55. See TTT, supra note 46. 
 56. Blizzard’s Overwatch allows users to save about an hour of completing repetitive in-
game goals per dollar paid. See Paul Tassi, The Math Behind Why Overwatch’s Loot Boxes 
Are Exhausting to Unlock, FORBES (June 10, 2016, 11:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/insertcoin/2016/06/10/the-math-behind-why-overwatchs-loot-boxes-are-exhausting-to-
unlock [https://perma.cc/Z3SC-54XX]. 
 57. In the mobile game Harry Potter:  Hogwarts Mystery, for example, the player 
becomes trapped in a “Devil’s Snare,” which appears to slowly suffocate the player’s avatar.  
At this point, the player runs out of the “energy” that allows them to complete tasks within the 
game.  The player may either pay for some quick energy and escape the snare or wait for hours 
for the energy to recharge. Julia Alexander, Harry Potter:  Hogwarts Mystery’s In-App 
Purchases, Wait Times Turning Players Away, POLYGON (Apr. 27, 2018, 12:08 PM), 
https://www.polygon.com/2018/4/27/17290168/harry-potter-hogwarts-mysterys-devils-
snare-purchases-wait-time [https://perma.cc/X6XG-3U8K]. 
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or the user may be required to “check in” every twenty-four hours, or even 
every four hours, to collect a bonus toward the goal.58  At some point, an 
invested player will be worn down to the point where it appears rational to 
spend, say, $2.99 and skip ahead to the sought-after goal.59  At this point, of 
course, another in-game goal appears and the cycle begins again. 
Most players never pay, and most of those who do pay very little.  Instead, 
most revenue from micropayments is highly concentrated among a small 
group of apparent addicts who individually spend thousands of dollars on in-
app purchases.  One study showed that 0.15 percent of mobile gamers 
account for 50 percent of the industry’s revenue from micropayments.60  
About 1.9 percent make up 90 percent of revenue.61  These gamers are called 
“whales” within the video game industry, and they compensate for the 
overwhelming majority of gamers who either never pay or who pay very 
little.62  In this respect, the video game industry’s revenue structure is coming 
to resemble that of the gambling industry and the alcohol industry, where 
addicted customers also account for most of the profits.63  The term “whale,” 
in fact, originated in the casino industry.64  And as in the casino industry, the 
whale-centered model can be highly profitable.  The freemium65 mobile 
game Game of War, despite its poor critical reception, draws a yearly average 
 
 58. William Grosso, The Science & Craft of Designing Daily Rewards—and Why FTP 
Games Need Them, GAMASUTRA (June 13, 2016, 5:32 PM), http://www.gamasutra.com/ 
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Shake-Down, GUARDIAN (May 4, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
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game ‘gem’ currency, but I worked out that you’d have to spend about £10 a day just to play 
Hogwarts Mystery for 20 consecutive minutes.”). 
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SWRVE (Feb. 25, 2014), https://www.swrve.com/company/press/swrve-finds-015-of-mobile-
gamers-contribute-50-of-all-in-game-revenue [https://perma.cc/4QBG-UU3H]. 
 61. Klubnikin, supra note 50. 
 62. Paul Tassi, Why It’s Scary When 0.15% Mobile Gamers Bring In 50% of the Revenue, 
FORBES (Mar. 1, 2014, 4:28 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2014/03/01/why-
its-scary-when-0-15-mobile-gamers-bring-in-50-of-the-revenue/ [https://perma.cc/VK7A-
HBER]. 
 63. See generally Tiffany Hsu, Video Game Addiction Tries to Move from Basement to 
Doctor’s Office, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/17/ 
business/video-game-addiction.html [https://perma.cc/6Y8Z-B4VW]. 
 64. See Lisa Fletcher et al., Biggest Loser?:  Gambler Dropped $127M in a Year, ABC 
NEWS (Dec. 8, 2009), https://abcnews.go.com/GMA/gambler-dropped-127-million-vegas-
blames-casino-losses/story?id=9272730 [https://perma.cc/5FCN-8QP4]. 
 65. “Freemium” is a portmanteau of “free” and “premium”:  free for now, and you pay 
later for more content. See Brian X. Chen, Playing at No Cost, Right into the Hands of Mobile 
Game Makers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/19/ 
technology/game-makers-give-away-freemium-products.html [https://perma.cc/7ZQX-
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of $550 per player—a remarkable figure given the overwhelming majority of 
players who pay very little.66 
This unbalanced revenue structure may give game developers strong 
incentives to encourage addiction-driven, whale-like purchases.  But gaming 
companies often have a collateral interest in addicting nonpaying players as 
well.  First, a player who keeps playing might pay later on; a player who 
walks away will not.  Second, many mobile games contain a social dimension 
that is enhanced by widespread participation.  In Design Home, for example, 
players rate and review each other’s attempts at interior design.67  In Marvel 
Strike Force, players join together in “alliances” to fight major battles and to 
compare victories—a social dynamic that creates a sense of obligation.68  
Nonpaying players who participate in these activities enhance the games’ 
allure for the whales and potentially promote the games to others.69  For both 
of these reasons, it is in game developers’ interest to ensure that their 
customers, both paying and nonpaying, spend as much “time on device” as 
possible. 
B.  An Overview of Habit-Forming Design 
Developers drive time on device by producing user interface (UI) and user 
experience (UX) design practices that draw the user into compulsive 
behavior.  Natasha Dow Schüll, a leading researcher of the casino industry, 
has commented that UX design is “about looping people into these flows of 
incentive and reward.  Your coffee at Starbucks, your education software, 
your credit card, the meds you need for your diabetes.  Every consumer 
interface is becoming like a slot machine.”70 
Insiders in the tech industry share Schüll’s assessment.  In a recent BBC 
documentary, for instance, several former Facebook executives stepped 
forward to explain how core design features they had personally invented 
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 67. Leslie Katz, This Game Will Make You Obsessed with Rattan Ottomans and 
Watercolor Whales, CNET (Sept. 6, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/design-
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Played All Year, GAME INFORMER (June 8, 2018, 8:58 PM), https://www.gameinformer.com/ 
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played-all [https://perma.cc/4JL8-E54U]. 
 69. See Schubert, supra note 53 (“[T]he game is served well by having a large free-to-
play population. . . .  Even if only a fraction [of players] are paying for your game, having a 
free population of a couple million means that you have a couple million people potentially 
evangelizing the game to their friends and family.”). 
 70. Ian Leslie, The Scientists Who Make Apps Addictive, ECONOMIST:  1843 (Oct./Nov. 
2016), https://www.1843magazine.com/features/the-scientists-who-make-apps-addictive 
[https://perma.cc/DK52-M22V]. 
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exploited weaknesses in human psychology.71  These design features include 
the “Like” button, the News Feed’s endless scroll, which enables the user to 
see more posts without stopping to ask for more, and even the choice to use 
the color red in notification badges.72 
Sean Parker, the inventor of Napster and later the first company president 
at Facebook, told interviewers that UI designers have “exploit[ed] a 
vulnerability in human psychology” by “giv[ing] users ‘a little dopamine 
hit’” when doing so would help the company “consume as much of [the 
users’] time and conscious attention as possible.”73  Aza Raskin, inventor of 
the infinite scroll at Mozilla, told interviewers that behind every phone 
screen, there are about a thousand engineers who work on increasing 
addictiveness.74  Leah Pearlman, inventor of the “Like” button, admitted that 
the feature had her “kind of addicted to the feedback.”75  “It’s . . . exactly the 
kind of thing that a hacker like myself would come up with,” said Sean 
Parker.76  “The inventors [and] creators,” he continued, “understood [the 
addictive potential] consciously.  And we did it anyway.”77 
The techniques designers use to produce these effects vary, but Nir Eyal’s 
2014 bestseller, Hooked:  How to Build Habit Forming Products, helpfully 
boils them down to a four-step process.  “The ultimate goal of a habit-
forming product,” he writes, “is to solve the user’s pain by creating an 
association so that the user identifies the company’s product or service as the 
source of relief.”78  The ideal is “unprompted user engagement, bringing 
users back repeatedly, without depending on costly advertising or aggressive 
messaging.”79 
In the first step, the user is “triggered” to use the product.80  Early on, this 
trigger is “external.”81  It comes from advertising, or from an invitation from 
a friend to join Facebook or Instagram.82  Or perhaps the user is “triggered” 
to download a game from iTunes or the App Store as a response to what Eyal 
terms the “pain”83 of boredom.  After repeated use, the user picks up “internal 
 
 71. See Hilary Andersson, Social Media Apps Are “Deliberately” Addictive to Users, 
BBC NEWS (July 4, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-44640959 [https:// 
perma.cc/27T4-GD9U]. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Olivia Solon, Ex-Facebook President Sean Parker:  Site Made to Exploit Human 
“Vulnerability,” GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2017, 3:11 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
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 74. Andersson, supra note 71. 
 75. Id. 
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 77. See Thuy Ong, Sean Parker on Facebook:  “God Only Knows What It’s Doing to Our 
Children’s Brains,” VERGE (Nov. 9, 2017, 10:21 AM), https://www.theverge.com/ 
2017/11/9/16627724/sean-parker-facebook-childrens-brains-feedback-loop 
[https://perma.cc/Q6FU-UZAN]. 
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 79. Id. at 5. 
 80. Id. at 39–60. 
 81. Id. at 41. 
 82. Id. at 44–47. 
 83. Id. at 52. 
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triggers” that prompt the user to take action without any need for outside 
intervention.84  Simple habit formation may do the job, as the user comes to 
rely on a phone app as a quick cure for boredom.85  But many apps set goals 
for the user which encourage the process of internal trigger formation.86  
Snapchat’s “streak” feature, for instance, counts the number of consecutive 
days that two friends have used the platform to communicate with each 
other.87  If either friend misses a day, then the streak is lost.88 
In step two, the triggered user takes action by downloading, registering for, 
or using the application.89  Scrolling through the Facebook News Feed or 
“pulling down” to see recent tweets constitutes action, and Eyal advises that 
successful developers make the barriers to action as low as possible; ideally, 
the user should be able to act without stopping to think before doing so.90  On 
Pinterest, for example, users can simply scroll forever without ever needing 
to hit a “See More” button.91  The user can simply keep scrolling, and the 
service will keep serving up more pinned items.92  If the user stops scrolling, 
the site displays some images as cut off at the fold, indicating that there is 
still more to see.93 
The endless scroll monetizes the same human tendency that was illustrated 
by the famous “bottomless bowl of soup” experiment.94  One group was 
served a normal bowl of tomato soup.95  The other group was served a bowl 
of tomato soup that was literally “bottomless”:  a tube under the table kept 
pumping in more soup.96  The group with the bottomless bowls of soup ate 
on average about 73 percent more soup seemingly because, without having 
to stop and ask for seconds, they had no opportunity to reflect on how hungry 
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they actually were.97  This bottomless approach to the scroll is widespread 
among social apps today.98 
In step three, after the user takes action, the system serves up a “variable 
reward”—a reward that, as on a slot machine, varies on a random basis.99  
The core of the addiction machine, variable rewards’ addictiveness was first 
discovered in a series of experiments on pigeons and rats.100  These animals 
were given a food-pellet dispenser with a lever.101  Predictable results meant 
that these animals would push the lever when they wanted a snack.102  But 
when the rewards were randomized, the animals would press endlessly on 
the lever, hungry or not.103 
The variable reward is overt in many gaming applications.  As explained 
in Part II, many online games offer “loot boxes” to players in exchange for 
micropayments of a dollar or two.104  After paying, the loot box opens in an 
animated sequence to reveal a pseudorandomized set of in-game items such 
as character upgrades.105  Some items are rare, and some are junk; the 
similarity to the ups-and-downs appeal of the slot machine is impossible to 
miss. 
Other applications involve a subtler variable reward component.  Perhaps 
the most common application of the variable reward principle is in the “pull 
to refresh” feature found in most phone apps.106  “Pull down” in Facebook 
or in your podcasting app, for example, and the app will load a new, and 
unpredictable, set of updates.  The feature contributes nothing to 
functionality; apps such as Facebook could just as easily notify the user when 
an event occurs.  Instead, it is designed, like the pull of a slot machine or the 
press of a food-dispenser lever, to engage the user.107  And as for the 
“loading”?  It is usually a contrivance—nothing but a visual animation 
displayed to whet the appetite.108 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Quora, Snapchat, and Pinterest all employ the infinite 
scroll. Vinit Joshi, The Problem with Infinite Scrolling Feeds, MEDIUM (July 18, 2017), 
https://blog.newtonhq.com/the-problem-with-infinite-scrolling-feeds-e3d1aad2c078 
[https://perma.cc/CQ3V-H7FH]. 
 99. EYAL, supra note 1, at 95. 
 100. Id. at 99. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 105. See Senate Environment and Communications References Committee, Parliament of 
Australia, Gaming Micro-Transactions for Chance-Based Items (Report, November 2018) 2–
3 [1.11]–[1.13]. 
 106. See Tristan Harris, The Slot Machine in Your Pocket, SPIEGEL ONLINE (July 27, 2016, 
5:25 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/smartphone-addiction-is-part-of-the-
design-a-1104237.html [https://perma.cc/V3AA-ZBWM]. 
 107. See id.; Julian Morgans, The Secret Ways Social Media Is Built for Addiction, VICE 
(May 21, 2017, 4:30 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/vv5jkb/the-secret-ways-
social-media-is-built-for-addiction [https://perma.cc/BHV7-XQ6E]. 
 108. Morgans, supra note 107 (“You know when you open Instagram or Twitter and it 
takes a few moments to load updates?  That’s no accident.  Again, expectation is part of what 
makes intermittent variable rewards so addictive.  This is because without that three-second 
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Small design tweaks can be extremely effective at enhancing the sense of 
reward.109  T. Dalton Combs of Boundless Mind (formerly known as 
Dopamine Labs) explains how his firm might enhance a product’s addictive 
neural “kick”:  “When you text a friend a ‘Congratulations’ iMessage, you 
get confetti falling from the top—those little elements are called UI sugar. . . .  
Then, on a user-by-user basis, we change that sugar to make it more or less 
enticing to build that habit over time.”110 
In step four, after collecting the variable reward, the user is encouraged to 
invest somehow in the product by doing a “bit of work” on it—for example, 
by updating a Facebook profile or posting a photo to Instagram or Pinterest.  
This investment is then used to restart the cycle.111  After sinking this 
investment into the product, the user becomes “internally triggered” to come 
back and check on its performance:  Who commented?  What did they say?  
How many likes?112 
The user’s investment can be leveraged to trigger and reward others as 
well.  Post a photo to Facebook with one of your friends in it, and Facebook 
will send an external trigger to your friend with a push notification.113  Your 
friend will then take action by opening the Facebook app, and in return 
Facebook will show your friend the variable reward of a photo that may be 
flattering or may be embarrassing.114  The sweet spot for Facebook, of 
course, is for your friend’s social anxiety to internally trigger them to check 
the photo later and see how other Facebook users have evaluated their 
appearance.  Those users, through their own investments, will have variably 
rewarded or punished your friend with likes, comments, or silence.115 
Along the way, your friend’s actions and investments will have helped 
Facebook “improve the product” by giving the algorithms information about 
what “engages” your friend.  Facebook’s algorithms will then incorporate 
this information into the schedule of “triggers” and “rewards” that it serves 
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 109. Shieber, supra note 3 (noting that “Dopamine Labs predicts they can add 10 percent 
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 110. April Glaser & Will Oremus, Fighting Tech with Tech, SLATE (Nov. 24, 2017), 
https://slate.com/technology/2017/11/dopamine-labs-t-dalton-combs-on-tech-addictions-
and-habits-on-if-then-podcast.html [https://perma.cc/P6QU-PSAY]. 
 111. EYAL, supra note 1, at 143–47. 
 112. Id. at 154–61. 
 113. See generally What Types of Notifications Does Facebook Send?, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/1668906000006551 [https://perma.cc/JQX7-YK5T] (last 
visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
 114. See generally Britney Fitzgerald, One in Four Women Deliberately Posts Unflattering 
Pictures of Facebook Friends, Survey Finds, HUFFINGTON POST (July 3, 2012, 1:21 PM), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/one-in-four-women-unflattering-photos-
facebook_n_1646499 [https://perma.cc/8BBZ-6QAU]; What Is Tagging and How Does It 
Work?, FACEBOOK, https:// www.facebook.com/help/124970597582337/ [https://perma.cc/ 
446W-2VVQ] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
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to your friend—particularly in the News Feed, the endless scroll of ads and 
variable rewards that greet users every time they open the app.116 
C.  What’s the Harm? 
Habit-forming design causes at least three types of harm:  addiction, strain 
on social norms, and degradation of public discourse. 
1.  Extreme Cases of Problem Use 
First, there is acute and severe harm that occurs to a relatively small group 
of “problem users”—time and money losses generally similar to those 
suffered by problem gamblers.  In one extreme case, an anonymous poster 
on Reddit wrote that the F2P mobile game Final Fantasy Brave Exvius 
appealed to him as “[a] short format game that I could play for 5 or 10 
minutes and put it away.”117  He said, “I am currently $15,800 in debt.  My 
wife no longer trusts me.  My kids, who ask me why I am playing Final 
Fantasy all the time, will never understand how I selfishly spent money I 
should have been using for their activities.”118 
This “problem gaming disorder,” as defined by the WHO,119 “affects only 
a small proportion of people who engage in digital- or video-gaming 
activities.”120  The situation is similar to that in the gambling industry, where 
only a small percentage of the population develops a serious habit.121 
Industry leaders in both the tech and the gambling sectors emphasize the 
behavioral nature of the problem, and they suggest that they are not 
responsible for the small minority’s problems with impulse control.122  
People can develop behavioral addictions to any product, they say, or any 
behavior, and individual propensities are often a determining factor.123 
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Prevalence and Predictors of Video Game Addiction:  A Study Based on a National 
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(showing 1.4 percent “addicted gamers” and 7.3 percent problem gamers among a randomly 
selected sample of Norwegian gamers). 
 121. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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18 (2012). 
 123. Howard Shaffer, director of the Harvard Medical School Division on Addiction, was 
one of the first to call slot machines “the crack cocaine of gambling.” Id.  But after forming 
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But the industry plays a strong contributory role.  Both the casino and the 
mobile gaming industries draw most of their revenue from that same small 
percentage of vulnerable users.124  Developers have strong incentives to drive 
problem use, just as casinos do, and they make every effort to do so. 
The similarity between tech addiction and gambling addiction is less 
striking outside of gaming, where in-app purchases are less common.  But 
the heavy “gamification” that pervades these applications, together with the 
developers’ shared imperative to drive engagement at all costs, suggests that 
the phenomenon of “problem use” extends beyond the gaming sector. 
2.  Social Norms and Lifestyle 
The clinical debate around “gaming addiction” overlooks a more 
significant consumer protection issue:  the average person’s compulsive 
attachment to smartphones and, in particular, the social media and gaming 
applications that run on them.  One study shows that twentysomethings check 
their phones eighty-five times a day on average, and that more than half of 
these check-ins last less than thirty seconds.125  The study shows that average 
Americans use their phones for five hours in total every day.126  Still, another 
study shows that users touch their phones 2617 times per day.127 
Norms of constant distraction have emerged to feed these habits.  It is now 
a social norm, for example, for two people eating together to keep their 
phones face up on the table and check incoming messages during their 
meal.128  It is increasingly common to stop in the middle of a conversation to 
respond to a text.129  One survey by Verizon reports that 77 percent of users 
turn to their phones first thing in the morning and nearly 90 percent use their 
phone in the bathroom.130 
Governments in liberal societies should not generally take activities off the 
table simply because they are a waste of time.  But it is unclear whether 
regulation of addictive design would necessarily substitute the government’s 
judgment for consumers’ judgment.  People may be spending much more 
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time checking their phones than they realize or prefer.  If the regulatory goal 
is simply to make product design less manipulative, then regulation in 
principle exists to enhance rather than diminish tech users’ freedom of 
choice.  And of course, any concerns that restrictions on habit-forming design 
are overly paternalistic can be ignored insofar as the regulation is targeted at 
children’s products. 
It is also worth considering the miscellaneous external harms that flow 
from compulsive tech use.  Early studies indicate drops in productivity, 
empathy, and general intelligence when smart devices are in the room.131  
High-income workers and executives in the tech industry disproportionately 
prefer low-tech and no-tech private schooling for their children.132 
Even to the extent that some of these harms might be called “aesthetic” or 
“cultural,” recall that governments regulate simple nuisances all the time.  
Think of the do-not-call list,133 or the law that attempts to regulate spam 
email,134 or the local ordinances that regulate shrubbery and house paint.135  
In each of these cases, the government has stepped in to regulate a mostly 
aesthetic harm in order to enhance general quality of life. 
3.  The Public Sphere 
The third harm is less focused but more severe:  addictive tech’s distortive 
effect on public discourse and ultimately the democratic process. 
There are reasons to suspect that the old marketplace of ideas is undergoing 
renovation as a state-of-the-art casino.  Just like twenty-first-century casinos, 
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social media platforms surveil their users to ensure that the state of play is 
always adapting to the players’ emotional needs.  For example, “luck 
ambassadors” in a casino use real-time data from slot machines to anticipate 
the point when a disappointed or fatigued gambler might be ready to walk 
away from the machine.136  When that happens, it is time to approach the 
gambler with a free drink, or tickets to a show, or some other pick-me-up.137  
Facebook executives bragged about an eerily similar ability to a group of 
Australian bankers:  the platform can detect when teenage users “feel 
‘insecure,’ ‘worthless’ and ‘need a confidence boost.’”138 
This is not to say that online platforms necessarily drive engagement by 
boosting mood.  To the contrary, it seems that the most reliable engagement 
drivers are messages that stimulate feelings of outrage and group 
identification.139  Many recommendation algorithms—YouTube’s most 
prominently—have been shown repeatedly to send users along a 
“radicalizing” path.140  These platforms in essence have devised a guided 
daydream that monetizes our weaknesses for tribalism and negative 
rumination. 
Social media platforms’ constant pandering to these emotions has likely 
informed, if not driven, the content of today’s angry tribal politics.  But the 
engagement model has also warped the underlying physics of public 
discussion.  Finding personally interesting content in the pre-internet era 
required some amount of deliberation or at least intention—a person would 
find new sources either through friends or through store owners, or maybe 
by browsing in a bookstore or library.  Today’s recommendation algorithms, 
on the other hand, keep users always “on the rails,” to borrow a term from 
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video gaming.141  A user with a budding interest does not need to seek it 
out—the News Feed will ensure that this content finds the user. 
Importantly, the user may not realize that they are predisposed to engage 
with a given kind of content; the algorithm takes the work of self-discovery 
off the user’s hands.  In some cases, these recommendations are helpful.  But 
they can also be harmful—for instance, when YouTube helps users 
“activate” authoritarian tendencies that might otherwise have lain 
dormant.142 
By serving users’ “revealed preferences” rather than stated preferences, 
user engagement algorithms largely crowd out the individual’s role in 
cultivating a set of interests and values.143  But as on a slot machine, the 
device must cultivate an illusion of control to maintain the compulsion.  Slot 
machines carry this principle to an extreme; users are led to believe that they 
know exactly when to stop the spinning reels, when in truth the payout has 
already been calculated.144  On YouTube, the effect is more subtle; the user 
may choose to discriminate among a seemingly endless universe of sources, 
when in truth the menu of options has already been rigorously pruned to fit 
the user’s own preexisting temptations.145  Facebook users who “like,” share, 
and comment on what they see are given an apparent opportunity to express 
themselves in public discussions, though the recommendation algorithm 
determines who will see it and when.146 
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Speed reinforces the compulsive flow of a slot machine, and social apps 
thrive on the same phenomenon.147  Social platforms, craving data, strive to 
make posting as quick and spontaneous as possible; they do not want users 
to think for too long before they speak or share.148  The obvious and 
unfortunate result is a more hot-blooded and emotionally reflexive media 
environment than was possible on slower media.149  Inevitably, speakers say 
ill-considered things every day, often triggering cycles of mass indignation 
and recrimination that enlighten no one and reverberate over multiple news 
cycles.150  “Online mobs” are a commonplace,151 and they can easily become 
real mobs in markets, such as Sri Lanka’s or Myanmar’s, where platforms 
have not invested heavily in top-down censorship.152 
The “fire” of violence and mass hatred that concerned the U.S. Supreme 
Court in its early free speech opinions appears to catch far more quickly and 
easily on social media.153  Much of this may result from the simple fact that 
speakers have been placed in such close and constant contact with each other.  
But it also may be that outside behavioral manipulation has compromised the 
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role of individual deliberation as the public sphere’s most effective natural 
safeguard against disaster.154  And this is to say nothing of the unprecedented 
opportunities that platforms’ engagement-driving techniques have given 
saboteurs who look to spread misinformation and engineer social conflict. 
The dominant prescription for these problems today is either to encourage 
or require platforms to take down dangerous content.  The fiat-based solution 
called “content moderation” would be condemned as an unconstitutional 
prior restraint if it were instituted by a state or the federal government.  It is 
a “private” solution to the mess, but this formalism masks a fundamental 
betrayal of the free speech concept.  Justice Louis Brandeis wrote of free 
speech both as “an end and as a means” to preserve liberty.155  Addictive 
social media architecture threatens free speech in both senses. 
II.  PROSPECTS FOR REGULATION 
Today, the problem of compulsive tech use is not widely understood, or 
widely acknowledged, as either a serious public problem or a serious private 
problem for any but the most desperately addicted individuals.  There is little 
public or institutional drive to address it.  Scattered K–12 schools require 
students to put cell phones away during the school day (even as many more 
have chosen to “innovate” by providing all students with branded, internet-
capable tablet devices under discounted contracts with manufacturers).156  
Private nonprofits have run ad campaigns encouraging parents to put their 
cell phones away at the family dinner table.157  But the lack of any strong or 
consistent public response seems to reflect an equivocal position about 
humanity’s deepening absorption into its “smart” devices:  the times and the 
norms are understood to be changing, some ways good, some ways bad, but 
almost entirely within a rubric of personal or parental responsibility. 
Much of this laissez-faire attitude is rooted in the underlying technologies 
being so new.  There has been no high-profile addiction crisis—nothing in 
the ballpark of the opioid epidemic, for example—to capture public attention.  
Even to the extent that the public is aware of the problem, it can at times 
 
 154. See Cohen, supra note 143, at 1917–18 (“The modulated society . . . continually 
adjust[s] the information environment to each individual’s comfort level.  Liberal democratic 
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improvements in the realization of political and social ideals.  The modulated citizenry lacks 
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 155. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 156. See Carolyn Thompson, More US Schools Consider Allowing Students to Use 
Cellphones, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/ 
Education/2018/0403/More-US-schools-consider-allowing-students-to-use-cellphones 
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Search for Smart Policies, EDUC. WEEK (Feb. 8, 2018, 11:21 AM), https:// 
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oms_K12_education.html [https://perma.cc/QTS7-P3GG]. 
 157. See, e.g., Tim Nudd, Will Ferrell’s Darkly Comic New Ads Show How Our Devices 
Are Ruining Family Time, AD WEEK (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.adweek.com/brand-
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time/ [https://perma.cc/MJD5-Z77M]. 
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appear unlikely that strong regulation is even possible.  Too many lawmakers 
lack basic understanding of the subject matter, as Facebook CEO Mark 
Zuckerberg’s 2018 congressional hearings revealed,158 and tech industry 
lobbyists have eagerly offered their own expertise to compensate.159 
The state of the art, moreover, is still primitive and unthreatening 
compared with what may be coming in the next ten or twenty years.  As 
transformative as early twenty-first-century smartphones have been, the 
major tech companies are moving toward products that are significantly more 
invasive and omnipresent. 
In 2017, for example, Facebook announced that it plans to roll out its 
product in “augmented reality”:  wearable products that overlay a consumer 
interface onto the user’s perception of real-world environments.160  And 
around the same time, the company announced that it was developing a 
wearable product that allows the user to type by thinking.161  At a minimum, 
these extensions of Facebook’s product will expand surveillance, targeted 
advertising, and gamification into the entire phenomenological space.  At a 
maximum, user dependency and stimulus response will empower Facebook 
to transcend the whole concept of “advertising” and sell user stimulus 
response itself to clients.  Much, as always, will depend on Facebook’s own 
internal culture of ethics and self-restraint. 
If future developments along these lines raise public concern, then the 
regulatory response should escalate with the sense of urgency.  Light-touch 
responses would try to help consumers make good decisions.  More dramatic 
responses would simply disable products’ most dangerous features.  Some or 
all of these protective measures may apply to minors or young children 
exclusively or, if the sense of emergency is especially pronounced, the 
protections may apply across the market. 
Part II.A discusses the requirements that might be imposed on app 
developers and distributors as part of an effort to police addictive tech.  These 
run the gamut from simple labeling and disclosure requirements to total 
product bans, as well as a few more novel intermediate options.  Part II.B 
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https://www.forbes.com/sites/patrickmoorhead/2017/04/20/facebook-f8-day-2-recap-10-
year-roadmap-for-vr-comms-brain-interfaces-and-open-sourced-ai/ [https://perma.cc/FC4J-
G3LY]. 
 161. See James Titcomb, Mark Zuckerberg Confirms Facebook Is Working on Mind-
Reading Technology, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 19, 2017, 8:09 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
technology/2017/04/19/mark-zuckerberg-confirms-facebook-working-mind-reading-
technology/ [https://perma.cc/LY5A-TLB2]. 
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describes how these regulatory requirements might come into existence, 
whether through existing regulatory authority or through new law. 
A.  Strategies for Regulation 
1.  Labeling Requirements 
As in the field of tobacco regulation, the government may use product 
labeling to encourage consumers to make good choices.162  A traditional 
labeling strategy might require tech products to display general messages 
about risks associated with tech addiction and overuse.  These messages 
could be tailored to the specific risks that a given product presents.  A 
warning label for Snapchat, for example, could point the user to resources on 
goal-setting and social obligation as means of driving engagement.  
Minnesota’s proposed loot box law would require certain games to carry the 
following label:  “Warning:  This game contains a gambling-like mechanism 
that may promote the development of a gaming disorder that increases the 
risk of harmful mental or physical health effects, and may expose the user to 
significant financial risk.”163 
But the adaptable nature of tech products would also enable regulators to 
move beyond crude general-purpose appeals.  Apps might be required to post 
the amount of time the user has logged, whether in a given session or over a 
longer period such as a day or a week.  Other usage indices—such as the 
number of posts, likes, logins, swipes, or taps—might be displayed as well. 
2.  Responsible Use Devices 
One step beyond simple disclosure requirements might require apps to 
look for patterns of problem use and intervene with warnings or invitations 
to take a break at appropriate times.  Some casinos have voluntarily adopted 
“responsible gaming solutions” such as iView’s Intelligent Gaming Analysis 
Platform, or iGap.164  These casinos, Natasha Dow Schüll explains, have 
adopted the software to insure against burnout and maintain lifelong 
customers.165  The concept could easily be adapted to social media platforms, 
for instance, which have access to a much richer suite of data-analytics tools 
than casinos do. 
After Dopamine Labs (now rebranded as Boundless Mind) came under fire 
for a 60 Minutes profile describing its ability to make outside firms’ software 
 
 162. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012). 
 163. H.R. 4460, 90th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2018); cf. Assemb. 2194, 2017–2018 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); S. 3024, 29th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2018); H.R. 2727, 29th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2018); H.R. 2686, 29th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2018).  
 164. Responsible Gaming Solutions, IVIEWSYSTEMS, https://www.iviewsystems.com/ 
responsible-gaming [https://perma.cc/M7HD-WZ7G] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
 165. SCHÜLL, supra note 123, at 283. 
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more addictive,166 the firm released a product called Space that is designed 
to help users break away from patterns of compulsive app use.167  Space 
monitors the phone user’s device use for patterns of addiction and then 
intervenes between the user and the most alluring apps by forcing the user to 
wait for several seconds before the app opens.168  During this interval, Space 
invites the users along for a brief breathing exercise called the “moment of 
Zen.”169 
Other major firms have also introduced anti-addiction functionality into 
their own products in what appears to be the Silicon Valley equivalent of 
carbon offsetting.  Although these features are rarely, if ever, turned on by 
default,170 they appear to have real practical value for those who are 
interested in them.  Facebook and Instagram now allow users to check in on 
their daily use, to turn off notifications temporarily, and to set a timer that 
goes off when the user exceeds self-imposed limits.171 
It appears that these firms want to frame the addiction matter as a personal 
choice and set themselves up as willing helpers for however their customers 
wish to live their lives.  Importantly, however, the anti-addiction measures in 
apps like Facebook and Instagram are almost always turned off by default 
and buried in settings menus.172  But that could change if regulators required 
app developers to put anti-addiction functionality in the foreground of the UI 
rather than in an out-of-the-way settings menu, and even more so if the anti-
addiction functionality was turned on by default. 
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CNET (June 4, 2018, 10:50 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/apple-helps-you-kick-iphone-
addiction-with-ios-12/ [https://perma.cc/S89X-WU7Q]. 
 171. Nieva, supra note 170. 
 172. See Alex Hern, Facebook and Instagram to Let Users Set Time Limits, GUARDIAN 
(Aug. 1, 2018, 7:18 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/aug/01/facebook-
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3.  Bans on Dangerous Features 
Regulators could ratchet up the pressure further by requiring app 
developers to disable various features that are known to drive compulsive 
use.  Over the past year, for example, international regulators have 
investigated, regulated, and, in some cases, criminalized loot boxes—the 
pseudo-slot machine alluded to earlier.173  A pending bill in the U.S. Senate 
would prohibit their use in video games marketed to minors.174  A loot box 
is an in-game item—usually portrayed as some sort of closed container—that 
gives randomly selected in-game items to the player.175  The loot box itself 
is usually purchased with in-game virtual currencies that can be earned 
slowly through play or bought quickly for real cash.176  One or two dollars is 
typical.177  Loot boxes’ resemblance to slot machines is widely 
acknowledged.178  First, they distribute rewards in a pseudorandom scatter 
that is well-known to drive compulsive use.179  Second, loot boxes often 
exploit the same behavioral fallacies as slot machines by exposing users to 
artificially frequent “near misses.”180  These near misses create the mistaken 
impression that the user is closing in on a jackpot and encourage further 
use.181  Finally, both loot boxes and slot machines are often operated with 
tokens rather than actual currency.182  The exchange rate from dollar to token 
is typically unwieldy by design so that the user lacks any intuitive grasp of 
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how much “one more pull” or one more in-game purchase will cost.183  
Making financial cost an abstraction removes a significant cognitive speed 
bump. 
Loot boxes represent only one tool among a diverse kit of addictive design 
strategies that might come under scrutiny.  Users seem to be drawn in easily 
by goal-setting, such as in the pursuit of “badges” representing the user’s 
“achievements.”184  Early goals are met quickly, and they gradually become 
more demanding as the user progresses.185  One particularly effective goal-
setting tactic is to encourage users to maintain a “streak” of daily use.186  The 
streak increases by one for each day that the user checks in and performs the 
required action, and many apps bestow badges on users who maintain the 
streak for some given amount of time.187 
Apps also drive engagement by preying on social obligation.188  Facebook 
users, to give the most familiar example, are summoned daily to wish their 
many “friends” a happy birthday.  On Instagram, some conscientious users 
“Like” all of their friends’ posts and expect the same in return.  The platform 
guards this economy of mutual obligation zealously.189  When Rameet 
Chawla released Lovematically, “a platform that automatically likes every 
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single post that passes your Instagram feed,” Facebook—which owns 
Instagram—stopped the threat within two hours and “[a]ll posts on 
Facebook . . . that included links to Lovematically.com were deleted, and any 
attempts to post these links are still met with an error message.”190 
Other platforms lure users in by “notifying” them of tangential events 
involving people that they know.191  This may suggest that either the friend 
directed this news to the user or that the user is under some social obligation 
to weigh in—or some combination of the two.  But social media posts, unlike 
email or direct messages, are generally not directed to anyone in particular.192  
And to the extent that there is a social obligation to communicate about some 
event—an acquaintance’s birthday, for instance—the obligation may exist 
largely or entirely because the platform has cooked it up as an engagement 
driver.193 
Sometimes simple aesthetics can drive compulsive use.  It is well 
documented, for instance, that app developers display notifications in bright 
red because the color inspires a sense of urgency.194  Developers use 
animations of fireworks, explosions, and bursts of light to amplify the sense 
of reward when a user reaches a goal.195  Many applications draw out loading 
times artificially and accompany them with animations to create a sense of 
anticipation when users pull down and refresh their screens.196 
Snapchat’s “streak” feature combines these various techniques into a 
particularly potent cocktail of goal-setting, social obligation, randomized 
rewards, and aesthetic enticement.197  Users, typically teenagers, continue 
their streak with various friends by sending them each at least one “snap” a 
day.198  Breaking the streak is typically received among these younger users 
as a lack of commitment to the friendship.199 
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Today, loot boxes are the testing ground for regulating pernicious design 
features.200  Regulators could conceivably go much further in the future—
“streaks,” arbitrary notifications, and even certain aesthetic elements might 
come under scrutiny. 
Finally, regulators might step in to limit users’ access to certain tech 
products altogether.  It is easy to envision the FTC limiting minors’ access to 
the kind of habit-forming tech products that are today marketed to children 
without so much as a warning label.201  It is also easy to imagine many states’ 
self-exclusion laws, through which problem gamblers can lock themselves 
out of casinos, extended to certain apps that either resemble gambling or that 
already meet the state law definition of gambling. 
Lawmakers cutting adults off completely from any behaviorally addictive 
tech product would seem out of the question today.  Not even slot machines, 
long considered the “crack cocaine” of gambling, receive that kind of 
regulatory treatment.202  Over the long run, however, it is possible that we 
will see tech products dangerous enough to justify this extreme measure. 
4.  Counter-Addictive Design 
A final approach would introduce countermeasures to mitigate the habit-
forming effects of persuasive design.203  Some anti-addictive design might 
resemble the features discussed above, but without the option to turn them 
off:  time-outs, for instance, after a long period of use.  Another approach 
would allow unlimited use but subject to some degree of transactional 
friction.  Facebook users, for instance, might be prompted to pay some small 
amount of “postage” before putting up photos or commenting, or they might 
just be prompted to confirm or review their comment before doing so.  Or 
instead of the overconsumption-encouraging “infinite scroll” included in 
most apps today, apps might—like Google’s search results—show ten or so 
results at a time and require the user to “flip the page” after reaching the 
bottom. 
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In some Asian countries, some kinds of anti-addiction design are 
mandatory.  In addition to funding rehabilitation programs for tech addiction, 
the governments of South Korea, Vietnam, and Thailand have required that 
game developers and administrators implement technical features to frustrate 
minors’ attempts to overuse their products.204  Under “Cinderella” or 
“Shutdown” laws, game companies must remove gamers under the age of 
eighteen from their servers between the hours of midnight and 6:00 a.m.205  
China goes even further, requiring developers to incorporate “fatigue” 
mechanics into their games to make them less enticing after long periods of 
consecutive use.206  After three hours of use, the value of in-game items and 
rewards—such as experience points acquired for killing an enemy or 
ammunition picked up off the ground—must be cut down by half.207  After 
five hours of use, the player’s character begins to take damage minute by 
minute.208 
As alien as these laws may seem, they are not impossible as a technological 
matter.  The aversion is cultural and subject to change. 
B.  Tools for Regulation 
1.  Existing Tools for Regulation 
Some regulatory authority already exists to combat addictive tech without 
new legislation.  Gambling law, consumer protection law, and certain 
common law torts all provide avenues to regulate at least some aspects of 
addictive tech. 
a.  Gambling Law 
Certain applications do more than just borrow from casinos’ approach to 
design—instead, they involve either traditional gambling or something that 
resembles it closely enough to qualify as gambling under the law.  So it is 
fitting that gambling commissions would be the first legal authorities in the 
United States and Europe to regulate addictive tech design. 
Gambling in most jurisdictions, both in the United States and abroad, is 
defined by three elements:  first, the gambler must “stake or risk something 
of value”; second, “chance is a material factor”; finally, “successful play is 
rewarded by something of value.”209  These elements can be satisfied just as 
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 209. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling § 2 (2010). 
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well in an online setting as in a traditional offline setting, and many 
jurisdictions already regulate online gambling.210 
Now, gambling laws are being tested in two new contexts.  First, plaintiffs 
have brought claims against developers of “social casino” apps—free-to-play 
mobile apps that contain simulated slot machines, roulette, and other casino 
games that dispense virtual currency rather than actual cash.  Most of these 
claims have failed,211 but in Washington State they have been successful.212  
In Kater v. Churchill Downs Inc.,213 the Ninth Circuit held that Big Fish 
Casino, a social app, counted as an “illegal gambling game” under 
Washington law.214  Under a statutory remedy, members of the plaintiff class 
recovered in-game payments they had made to the game’s distributor—
payments that for some individuals amounted to thousands of dollars.215 
Second, gambling commissions around the world have considered 
regulating games that contain loot boxes.  Gambling commissioners in the 
Netherlands216 and Belgium217 have classified loot boxes as gambling under 
existing regulations and threatened companies that continue to market them 
to children with criminal fines.218  China and South Korea, which already 
regulate video gaming heavily, now require game developers to disclose 
players’ chances of winning.219  Commissioners in the United Kingdom and 
France have declined to classify loot boxes as gambling on decidedly 
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publicatie.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9JG-WTZM] (“[I]t is not important if a ‘skin’ in Overwatch, 
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technical grounds while still expressing concern.220  In 2018, U.S. state 
legislatures took up bills requiring game developers to shield minors from 
loot boxes and to disclose the odds to adults.221  Washington State considered 
a bill to require its gambling commission to investigate the practice.222 
Loot boxes and social casinos clearly satisfy the “chance” element of 
gambling.223  The other two elements present more difficulty.224 
Whether the gambler has provided consideration for the opportunity to 
play is an open question.  For purposes of contract law, users who open loot 
boxes and play social casinos apps provide consideration even absent cash 
payment.  In Gottlieb v. Tropicana Hotel & Casino,225 the court held that a 
gambler provided consideration by voluntarily taking a free spin on a 
casino’s “Million Dollar Wheel.”226  The court rejected the casino’s 
argument that the free spin was gratuitous, pointing out that the casino had 
collected valuable marketing data when the plaintiff had swiped her casino-
issued ID card.227  Gottlieb’s reasoning maps easily onto almost all free 
phone apps:  the user is always providing consumer data in exchange for 
some in-app experience.228  But in the same opinion, the Gottlieb court 
interpreted “consideration” to have a more constrained meaning, at least 
under New Jersey law.229  The court deferred to a formal opinion from the 
Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, concluding that the “legislative 
intent was to exclude from the statutory elements comprising the gambling 
offense the sort of personal inconvenience which will constitute 
consideration sufficient to support a contract.”230 
The “thing of value” element has become the sticking point.  Courts and 
gambling commissions that have declined to identify social casinos and loot 
boxes as gambling have generally done so by adopting an artificially 
constrained definition of “value.”231  First, they require an aftermarket to 
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exist for the in-game items.232  Second, the items must be transferable 
between accounts; the fact that players can sell their account passwords does 
not qualify.233  Finally, if the game developer’s terms of service forbid users 
to sell their virtual winnings for cash, then the winnings are not considered 
valuable.234 
This final requirement makes no sense.  The law does not normally hold 
that goods lose their value if the transaction is illegitimate.  Think of bribery, 
for example.  Bribery, too, requires that the briber offer a “thing of value” to 
the bribee.  An offer of unlawful narcotics would presumably qualify despite 
the goods’ legal illegitimacy.235  Why, then, should a gambling transaction 
be considered valueless because it violates another contract’s terms—an 
adhesion contract, no less?  It appears that many gambling commissions are 
simply hesitant to move into unfamiliar terrain and that this excessively 
formal approach to the “thing of value” element protects them from doing so.  
The effect of this final requirement is to allow video game and social casino 
developers to effectively opt out of gambling regulations through contractual 
boilerplate. 
At some level, the whole conversation around aftermarkets comes across 
as a distraction.  By extending or enhancing play, virtual items obviously 
deliver value to players who want them.236  This value is what gamers pay 
for when they drop quarters into arcade machines, or when they purchase 
“skins” for their avatars in online social games.  Unless we are to understand 
these transactions as something other than contractual interactions, the 
intangible or make-believe nature of the items, contrary to what at least one 
court has said,237 should make no difference.  There is no substantial 
difference between the purchase of an in-game item and a license to access a 
non-resellable e-book for a Kindle reader; both involve value exchanges.238 
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Jurisdictions may differ in their approaches to these questions, to be sure.  
Some jurisdictions’ gambling laws may be more accommodating to 
expansive rather than restrictive definitions of “value.”239  But absent some 
clear intent to exclude nonmonetary value, a hornbook definition of gambling 
would cover social casinos and loot boxes alike, and perhaps other 
monetization techniques to come. 
Plausible interpretations exist, then, that would give gambling 
commissioners jurisdiction over essentially any online game of chance—
including games of chance where no actual cash is exchanged.  That is about 
as far as an ambitious gambling commissioner could go without 
overreaching.  But within reason, gambling commissions are already well 
positioned to regulate some of the most habit-forming monetization 
mechanics in gaming today. 
b.  Consumer Protection 
The FTC has provided the country’s closest approximation of a common 
law of privacy.240  In particular, the agency has used its power under the FTC 
Act to police “unfair and deceptive practices” to pursue tech firms that violate 
their own advertised privacy policies.241  Absent a specific mandate to deal 
with habit-forming design techniques, the FTC may be able to adapt its 
privacy approach to the problem. 
Generally, the FTC has focused on deceptive practices and used its broader 
power over unfair practices sparingly.242  The FTC would likely bring that 
same approach to the problem of habit-forming tech design.  An unfair 
practice must satisfy three criteria that probably would be difficult to fulfill:  
first, the practice must cause substantial harm to consumers; second, the harm 
must not be reasonably avoidable by the consumer; third, the injury caused 
by the practice must not be outweighed by any countervailing benefit to 
competition or consumers.243 
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The first and third elements of unfairness pose problems for any near-term 
attempt to regulate habit-forming design.  The unformed state of the research 
on behavioral addiction may make a determination of “substantial harm” 
appear too conjectural.244  More significantly, the close tie between addictive 
design and app monetization would provide an avenue for tech companies to 
argue that their techniques for “driving engagement” are what enable them 
to offer software either cheaply or for free.245 
This calculus could change over the long term, however, as market 
conditions change.  Causal theories linking design and behavioral addiction 
may gain wider acceptance.  Better data analytics capabilities and a more 
absorbing user experience may come to intensify the habit-forming effect.  
Certain monetization strategies may come to look more like simple rent-
seeking with little to no consumer benefit at the margin.  And at least where 
major industry players like Google and Facebook are concerned, consumer-
risk exposure may no longer be reasonably avoidable.  In that environment, 
the FTC could engage in enforcement actions or rulemaking directed at habit-
forming technology as an unfair practice.  One would hope that by this point 
Congress would have provided the FTC or some other authority with a more 
specific mandate to combat the problem. 
In the near term, deceptiveness offers a more promising ground for 
regulation—most likely regulation of apps marketed to children.  The agency 
defines deception as a “representation, omission or practice that is likely to 
mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the 
consumer’s detriment.”246  When it has reached settlements with tech 
companies for deceptive practices, the Commission has preferred for obvious 
reasons to target firms that breach express promises.247  But in some 
deception cases the Commission has also settled with developers who 
breached reasonable consumer expectations rather than an express 
representation.248 
Habit-forming children’s apps offer the clearest target for rulemaking or 
enforcement under the Commission’s deceptive practices jurisdiction.  In 
Google’s Play Store and Apple’s iTunes Store, children’s apps are generally 
found in the “Family” section.249  But this reassuring label often conflicts 
with the developer’s aggressive monetization model.  In some cases, children 
have been lured into apps that have parted them from their parents’ money at 
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casino-like rates of thousands of dollars per hour.250  Even assuming that the 
parents avoid these kinds of charges, it stands to reason that few parents 
would expect such a manipulative presence from a game that sits in the 
“Family” section of the Google Play Store.251 
Part of the appeal of the “deceptive practices” approach to enforcement is 
that it would not require the FTC to take any position on the ultimate 
harmfulness or efficacy of habit-forming design.  All that matters is whether 
certain aggressive monetization techniques conflict with the parent’s 
reasonable expectation.252  As in the FTC’s recent settlement with a firm that 
misrepresented its baby mattresses as “organic,” the uncertain state of the 
underlying science is simply irrelevant.253 
In the course of these enforcement efforts, the FTC can begin to develop a 
“common law” of habit-forming tech in the same way that it has developed 
a “common law” of online privacy.254  Companies marketing children’s apps 
might be put on guard against incorporating certain suspect features in their 
products—features that may range from loot boxes to dual currency systems 
to overbearing notifications.255  In the process, regulators could catalyze the 
creation of a set of industry norms that might later be incorporated into 
rulemaking. 
c.  Common Law Torts 
Tort law, in principle, might provide a means for some plaintiffs to receive 
compensation for injuries that flow from compulsive tech use.  But the case 
law on behavioral addiction is not particularly inviting. 
First, several lawsuits have alleged that casinos and video slot machine 
manufacturers owe problem gamblers a duty of care; none have 
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succeeded.256  In Stevens v. MTR Gaming Group, Inc.,257 the widow of a 
suicidal problem gambler sued a slot machine manufacturer on strict product 
liability and negligent design and failure to warn theories.258  The court held 
that the state’s pervasive regulation of the gambling industry259 precluded 
any inference that the legislature would have meant to leave casinos or game 
manufacturers stuck with a common law duty of care.260  Courts in other 
states have reached the same result through similar reasoning.261 
Unlike their counterparts in the gambling industry, the tech companies 
who might sit as defendants in a tech-addiction tort case do not belong to 
heavily regulated industries.  In principle, that should make the early 
gambling cases easy to distinguish; in tech, there is no regulatory apparatus 
to displace the ordinary tort law duty of care.   
The First Amendment, however, may still prevent plaintiffs in tech-
addiction tort cases from receiving compensation.  In Watters v. TSR, Inc.,262 
the plaintiff attempted to link the publishers of Dungeons & Dragons, a 
tabletop role-playing game, to the suicide of her adult son.263  The Sixth 
Circuit granted summary judgment to the publisher, reasoning that the 
plaintiff had failed to establish fault or causation.264  The court also held that 
strict product liability was out of the question given the case’s First 
Amendment salience.265  The court noted that courts should “avoid applying 
the common law in a way that would bring the constitutional problems to the 
fore.”266 
Beyond Watters, the record for gaming addicts—or anything else that 
might offer a clear precedent for product liability on account of tech 
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addiction—includes only one other case.267  In Smallwood v. NCSoft 
Corp.,268 the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii allowed a similar 
set of claims to survive a motion to dismiss, but the suit’s pro se plaintiff did 
not proceed further.269  Unfortunately, the underlying complaint is so crudely 
drafted that it is somewhat hard to know what to take from the court’s 
reasoning. 
Hardly a promising record, in short.  But these cases are not totally 
plaintiff-preclusive either.  Recall that tobacco plaintiffs had logged a 
decades-long string of defeats before the first plaintiff award came in 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group.270  By the late eighties, however, an improved 
medical understanding of nicotine’s addictive qualities plus an emerging 
public consciousness of nicotine’s risks and the industry’s malfeasance 
helped Cipollone’s plaintiffs to succeed.271  The history of product litigation 
over behavioral addictions is short, and it is too early to predict that similar 
developments will not eventually come through. 
2.  New Tools for Regulation 
The existing regulatory capacity to police habit-forming design is limited.  
Social casinos, loot boxes, and similar devices that have not yet emerged can 
at least in principle be regulated in the same way that gambling is regulated.  
Depending on the jurisdiction’s approach to gambling, these regulations 
could include licensing procedures, odds disclosure requirements, self-
exclusion programs where problem gamblers can lock themselves out of 
regulated gambling establishments, and so on.  Consumer protection 
agencies, meanwhile, are well-positioned to police certain children’s apps 
that are monetized through aggressive habit-forming design.272  But for better 
or worse, no governmental entity today appears to have authority to police 
habit-forming design beyond the gaming sphere.  That authority will have to 
come from a new place. 
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§ 6505(a)–(e) (2012); see also 16 C.F.R. § 312.9 (2019). 
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a.  Piecemeal Legislation 
Over time, Congress may adopt legislation that attacks individually 
offensive design techniques piecemeal.  It is not too hard, for example, to 
imagine a statutory scheme designed to curb intrusive and misleading push 
notifications within phone apps—sort of a successor to the Controlling the 
Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act’s regulation of 
spam email.273  Another law might require mobile devices to come 
prepackaged with software to notify users when their app usage has exceeded 
reasonable limits—a utility similar to iOS’s Screen Time app but turned on 
by default. 
b.  A General Mandate 
Or Congress may grant a general mandate to an agency—most likely the 
FTC but perhaps even the Consumer Product Safety Commission—to 
regulate predatory design practices that tend to promote behavioral addiction.  
Vague as that may sound, addiction itself is a rather elastic term even among 
clinicians; it is no vaguer than similar terms, such as “unfair,” that are often 
found in enabling legislation.274  The Controlled Substances Act (CSA), in 
fact, contains language to the same effect:  the potential for “psychological 
or physical dependence” is a criterion left to the discretion of administrative 
officials.275 
Efficacy, of course, is another question.  New applications and platforms 
arise constantly, and those that already exist are always updating their design.  
New addictive designs are always emerging, and developers can vary them 
quickly in response to enforcement.  But this is not a totally unique or 
unprecedented concern.  The problem exists in the narcotics sector as well, 
where drug labs constantly tweak chemical compounds to avoid the 
application of the CSA’s “Schedule I.”276  Regulators have struggled to meet 
these innovations.277  The gambling industry, too, has its own colorful history 
of cat and mouse.278 
 
 273. Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 7701–7713 (2012). 
 274. The Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits “unfair” practices. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) 
(2012). 
 275. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(2)(C) (2012).  The Attorney General, in consultation with the 
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, may add new substances to the 
CSA’s five-category schedule of regulated and prohibited drugs. See id.  The Consumer 
Product Safety Act also uses vague language about “risk of injury” to instruct administrative 
rulemakers. See 15 U.S.C. § 2052 (2012) (“The term ‘risk of injury’ means a risk of death, 
personal injury, or serious or frequent illness.”).  An addendum referring to behavioral 
dependence—assuming that the language about “illness” does not already cover it—would 
hardly be out of place. 
 276. See Timothy P. Stackhouse, Note, Regulators in Wackyland:  Capturing the Last of 
the Designer Drugs, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 1105, 1111–18 (2012). 
 277. See id. at 1111. 
 278. One machine popular in the late 1990s and early 2000s, for example, sold borderline-
worthless one-minute phone cards for a quarter a piece. See generally Hest Techs., Inc. v. 
State ex rel. Perdue, 749 S.E.2d 429 (N.C. 2012).  Each card entered the purchaser in a 
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c.  Dry-Up-the-Market Approaches 
Finally, legislatures could address these problems from the outside, and 
not by restricting the contents of habit-forming tech products in themselves, 
but by blunting or destroying the incentive to make them in the first place. 
For products with advertising-based monetization models, the remedy is 
clear:  either restrict targeted advertising or make it less lucrative through 
taxation.  Within the short run, privacy regulation along the lines of the 
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation279 may provide some 
help along these lines.  Over the long run, and for reasons that transcend the 
addiction issue, governments should move toward a more general ban on the 
behavioral advertising industry—a radical move that would clearly violate 
the First Amendment and that would create a need for wider structural 
regulation to fund online content.280  Such a program is beyond the scope of 
this Article, but it would surely blunt the incentive to drive engagement. 
For products that are monetized through in-app purchases, there may be 
less dramatic solutions.  The law might, for example, set up caps on the total 
amount merchants could collect from a single user within a year.  Today, 
many microtransaction-based games are designed to target “whales”:  the 
0.15 percent of users who account for half of the revenue in the average 
microtransaction-financed game.281  These “whales,” spending thousands of 
dollars on average on a single game,282 would appear to be problem users.283  
As long as they make up game developers’ biggest profit center,284 though, 
developers will likely continue to design casino-like products that are 
optimized for problem use. 
A new statute might allow big spenders to retrieve every dollar spent in 
excess of some reasonable limit.  The limit could equal a dollar figure fixed 
by regulation—say, $100 per app—or it could be calculated on some floating 
 
sweepstakes with a risk-reward spread similar to a slot machine. See generally id.  Purchasers 
could collect their winnings from a cashier who would scan a QR code printed on the back of 
the card. See id. at 443.  More recently, gambling operators have opened internet cafes where 
gamblers purchase minute after minute of internet access alongside their chance to win. See 
generally United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2012).  Courts have never had much 
trouble peering through the veil. See Hest Techs., 749 S.E.2d at 430–31 (“[N]o sooner is a 
lottery defined, and the definition applied to a given state of facts, than ingenuity is at work to 
evolve some scheme of evasion . . . .  But, in this way, it is not possible to escape the law’s 
condemnation . . . .” (quoting State v. Lipkin, 84 S.E. 340, 343 (N.C. 1915)). 
 279. Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU). 
 280. See generally Kyle Langvardt, A New Deal for the Online Public Sphere, 26 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
 281. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 282. This is a rough extrapolation from the data indicating that 50 percent of mobile gaming 
revenue comes from 0.15 percent of players. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.  If 
that is the case, then the top 0.15 percent of players will pay at least $1000 so long as revenue 
is at least $2000 and the game raises $3 per player. 
 283. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 284. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
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basis.  One approach might say that for a given app, the limit should equal 
the total in-app expenditure level by users at the ninety-ninth percentile.  
Merchants and platforms such as Google Play and the iTunes Store could 
then be made jointly liable to provide quick refunds to any user who exceeds 
the limit.  Ideally, this policy would enlist the major platforms as enforcers 
against predatory design practices. 
III.  FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES 
Even modest efforts to regulate addictive design will likely be challenged 
as infringements on free expression.  How the law should handle these 
challenges, however, is unclear.  Two first-order questions arise. 
The first is a question of what Frederick Schauer has called “coverage.”285  
The coverage inquiry is distinct from the question of whether a type of speech 
will ultimately be protected from regulation or not.286  Instead it asks, in a 
given case, whether the First Amendment has any salience at all.287  In cases 
involving speech in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy, or insider trading, 
or obligations under a written contract, defendants do not even suggest that 
their use of language would entitle them to First Amendment protections.288  
Gambling operations are treated as similarly “uncovered”; though litigants 
have occasionally raised First Amendment challenges to gambling laws, their 
arguments have never been taken seriously.289  But the range of coverage is 
always expanding,290 and the Supreme Court has articulated no outer limit 
that might help to determine whether various addictive design techniques 
should be considered First Amendment subject matter at all.291  The case law 
is marked in places by language suggesting essentially total coverage for 
software,292 and tech industry lawyers have encouraged this maximal 
approach.293  But the case law is much likelier to reveal an approach that does 
 
 285. See generally Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment:  A 
Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004). 
 286. See id. at 1769–74. 
 287. See id. 
 288. See id. at 1783–84. 
 289. See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993) 
(“[G]ambling . . . implicates no constitutionally protected right; rather, it falls into a category 
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Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 580 F.3d 113, 118 n.8 (3d Cir. 2009) 
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ambit of the First Amendment”) (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)); 
Allied Veterans of World, Inc.:  Affiliate 67 v. Seminole County, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (M.D. 
Fla. 2011), aff’d, 468 F. App’x 922 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding that a county ordinance banning 
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 290. See generally Schauer, supra note 285. 
 291. See generally id. 
 292. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 447 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 293. See, e.g., Matthew Panzarino, Apple Files Motion to Vacate the Court Order to Force 
It to Unlock iPhone, Citing Constitutional Free Speech Rights, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 25, 2016), 
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not regard all software design as equally expressive for purposes of the First 
Amendment. 
A second question has to do with regulatory means and ends and their 
adequacy relative to whatever standard of heightened scrutiny might be in 
play.  The most obvious governmental purpose for regulating addictive 
design will have to do with public health, and in particular the public health 
of children who might be exposed to these products.  But there are deeper 
regulatory purposes at play as well—most prominently, a concern for the 
health of the same public sphere that the Free Speech Clause exists to protect. 
A.  Coverage 
Addictive design cuts across a variety of speech contexts that may be 
protected by the First Amendment.  At a minimum, the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Kater has introduced gambling regulation to the world of 
consumer video games, a medium that has been recognized to contain strong 
expressive salience for First Amendment purposes.294  Further regulation of 
addictive tech, even if it only affects products marketed to children, could cut 
closer to core constitutional territory.  In particular, Justice Anthony Kennedy 
recently recognized social media platforms as “the most important places . . . 
for the exchange of views” in the twenty-first century.295  Proponents of any 
consumer measure to deal with addictive design—beginning with the loot 
box bills now being considered in several states—should expect a First 
Amendment challenge. 
The outlines of such a challenge are obvious enough:  video game 
companies speak when they design video games.  When the government 
restricts loot boxes, it burdens games that contain one particular kind of 
content.  Facebook speaks by maintaining its service.  When the government 
requires Facebook to tell its users how long they have spent on the device, it 
compels Facebook’s authors to speak a message that is not their own.  And 
so on; these arguments lend themselves to efficient mass production.  After 
all, if UX design is just another expression for software’s content, then 
virtually any law that regulates software should count as a content-
discriminatory law of the sort that triggers strict scrutiny under today’s 
interpretation of the First Amendment.296 
These arguments’ viability, however, depends heavily on the level of 
generality that is chosen to define the problem.  First, a software product 
might be viewed holistically, as a single, unified article of speech.  On this 
generalistic account, laws that reach in and regulate a loot box, for example, 
have the effect of burdening one aspect of the speaker’s “message.”  This 
way of thinking has the advantage of simplicity, and it fits well with the 
current Supreme Court’s austere First Amendment style.  But carried to its 
logical conclusion, this approach would also require strict constitutional 
 
 294. See Kater v. Churchill Downs Inc., 886 F.3d 784, 785 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 295. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1734 (2017). 
 296. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2229–30 (2015) (finding that an ordinance 
regulating “temporary directional signs” was content discriminatory and unconstitutional). 
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scrutiny in any case involving the regulation of software.  This holistic view 
is not likely to survive sustained contact with twenty-first-century regulatory 
problems involving 3D-printable consumer products, cryptocurrency 
speculation, and so on.297 
Second, a piece of software might be viewed specifically, as a consumer 
product that integrates speech components with nonspeech components.298  
This approach would acknowledge the expressive components in various 
kinds of applications—literary or character elements in video games, shared 
media content in social media, etc.—without assuming that other purely 
mechanical components such as login credentialing or memory caching are 
expressive by association.  The question then becomes whether regulated 
items such as loot boxes, or infinite scrolls, or bright red notification badges 
constitute speech for First Amendment purposes on their own merits. 
As the following section demonstrates, courts have not yet chosen between 
the holistic and the particular approach. 
1.  The Holistic Approach 
If laws regulating addiction mechanisms in games or social media were 
challenged on First Amendment grounds, the challengers would likely cite 
certain relatively recent Supreme Court opinions as broad authority for the 
proposition that the medium being regulated is all but inviolable.  
Challengers might cite Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n299 for the 
proposition that video games are broadly protected.300  Challengers might 
cite Packingham v. North Carolina301 for the proposition that social media 
and its platforms are essentially inviolable.302  And challengers might cite 
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.303 in support of a “rule that information is 
speech”—a rule that could be interpreted to cover just about everything that 
happens on computers or the internet.304 
But a fair look at the case law reveals that the courts have never really said 
these things, and indeed they have never extended any special constitutional 
protection to tech products or the internet beyond what the First Amendment 
would ordinarily furnish in a low-tech setting. 
 
 297. See Kyle Langvardt, The Doctrinal Toll of “Information as Speech,” 47 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 761, 769–75 (2016). 
 298. In the world of tangible objects, there is no such thing as pure speech; even a book 
contains paper stock that is intuitively distinct from any expressive content.  The perception 
that software is different because of its intangible or conceptual nature is ultimately delusive.  
Credit, debt, governments, corporations, family relationships, and so on are all intangible and 
conceptual, and all intersect in various ways with activities that may be expressive for First 
Amendment purposes.  But that is no reason to say that these phenomena are somehow shot 
through in every dimension with First Amendment significance. 
 299. 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
 300. See id. at 790. 
 301. 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017). 
 302. See id. at 1734. 
 303. 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
 304. See id. at 571 (“The State asks for an exception to the rule that information is speech, 
but there is no need to consider that request in this case.”). 
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a.  Games 
In Brown, the Supreme Court invalidated a California law that prohibited 
the sale or rental of violent video games to minors and required them to be 
labelled “18.”305  Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a seven-justice majority, 
dispelled any notion that video games might deserve subordinate First 
Amendment status: 
Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video 
games communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many 
familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and 
through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player’s interaction 
with the virtual world).  That suffices to confer First Amendment 
protection.306 
None of the justices seemed to disagree on this initial point.307 
From here, Justice Scalia proceeded with a conventional content-
discrimination analysis.308  By singling out video games based on their 
content, the California statute opened itself up to strict scrutiny.309  
Supposing for the sake of argument that children’s well-being, broadly 
defined, constituted a compelling state interest, Justice Scalia nevertheless 
found the means-end fit lacking.310  The available social science, he wrote, 
had failed to establish a strong causal connection between the video games 
and any actual violence.311 
Brown never says that all video games are speech, and the Court had no 
occasion to do so.  Instead the case asked only whether portrayals of violence 
that occur in video games are speech—for those are all that the statute 
regulated.  So while challengers to a loot box law would inevitably cite 
 
 305. Brown, 564 U.S. at 789. 
 306. Id. at 790. 
 307. Justice Thomas’s dissent proposed, somewhat tangentially to the other justices’ 
discussion, that “speech to minor children bypassing their parents” is an unprotected category 
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 308. Brown, 564 U.S. at 799–803 (majority opinion). 
 309. See id. at 799. 
 310. The social science, he reasoned, failed to support the selective application of the law:  
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permission. Id. at 802.  If these games were really so harmful, he reasoned, then why not bar 
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 311. See id. at 800–02. 
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Brown as support for a thoroughgoing First Amendment protection for video 
games, the analogy is superficial.  Only three justices of the Brown Court 
discuss the features that distinguish videos games from media traditionally 
protected by the First Amendment—and far from suggesting that games as 
such deserve total protection, they express concern about interactive video 
games’ special potential for harm over and above noninteractive media.312 
A clear reading of Brown, then, leaves many aspects of gaming outside the 
First Amendment’s coverage.  No member of the Court addresses the 
relatively questionable “speechiness” of austere, nonrepresentative video 
games such as Pong or Candy Crush.  Video gambling machine operators 
have tried and failed in lower courts to invoke Brown in defense of 
“entertaining display[s]” that simulate slot machines.313  There is simply no 
“video games as speech” doctrine that offers any shelter to the various 
behavioral techniques that games and other types of “gamified” applications 
use to drive engagement. 
b.  Social Apps and Platforms 
The law extends certain extraordinary protections to online platform 
owners under the Communications Decency Act of 1996314 (CDA).  Section 
230 provides that online platform owners may not “be treated as the publisher 
or speaker of any information provided.”315  The CDA has indeed taken on 
such a strong protective aura that tech platforms have begun to raise § 230’s 
shield against liability in situations where it has no clear relevance.  The 
general counsel for Lyft, for example, has taken the position that the CDA 
protects it from vicarious liability for the torts of its drivers.316  Under these 
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 314. Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 56, 133–43 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18 and 47 U.S.C.). 
 315. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012). 
 316. See Abbey Stemler, The Myth of the Sharing Economy and Its Implications for 
Regulating Innovation, 67 EMORY L.J. 197, 217 (2017). 
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hyperprotective conditions, there has been no need for courts to engage 
seriously with the question of how much protection the First Amendment 
itself might provide to online platform owners. 
Even so, expectations have been set high.  Online platforms today are 
widely considered the First Amendment equivalent of newspaper editors.317  
Whatever the merit of this perhaps overly flattering analogy, it nevertheless 
would seem to reach only a corner of a Facebook’s or a Google’s 
operations—namely, the companies’ decisions to rank or censor content.  
Even if Facebook really is comparable to a newspaper, a decision to regulate 
addictive user design may be no more offensive than laws requiring the use 
of recycled newsprint.318  Just because an organization does a lot of editing 
does not mean that this editing permeates the entire enterprise. 
Then there is Justice Kennedy’s arresting remark in 2017’s Packingham v. 
North Carolina that the internet, particularly social media, “is the most 
important place[] . . . for the exchange of views.”319  Tonally, Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion in that case creates an unmistakable sense of anticipation 
that somebody involved with social media, whether users or the platforms 
themselves, will soon receive a new shelter under the First Amendment.  
Some banned social media users have cited the case to imply that social 
platforms are state actors.320  Social media operators may someday cite 
Kennedy’s words in support of a Lochner-like freedom of contract between 
platform and user. 
But the case, much like Brown, really says very little at all—only that it 
was overkill for the state of North Carolina to bar a released sex offender 
from most social media for life.  If a similar law applied in real space—say, 
one that made it unlawful for a convicted sex offender to communicate with 
people in public places such as streets and parks—it would have traversed 
the free speech pale.  Packingham says that total exile from major social 
platforms is unacceptable by the same token.321  This obvious extension of 
 
 317. See Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google:  First Amendment Protection for 
Search Engine Search Results, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 883, 884–85, 887 (2012); see also Miami 
Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256–58 (1974) (striking down a Florida statute 
granting a “right of reply” to political candidates personally attacked in newspaper editorial 
pages).  For opinions applying Tornillo to search engines, see e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. 
Google, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-646-FtM-PAM-CM, 2017 WL 2210029, at *3–4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 
2017); Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 436–43 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Langdon 
v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 629–30 (D. Del. 2007). 
 318. These laws may raise First Amendment concerns, however, if they are imposed 
differentially. See generally Richard Madris, Comment, Recycled Newsprint Laws and 
Differential Taxation of the Press, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1069 (1994) (urging that recycled 
newsprint laws are unconstitutional because they affect only newspapers). 
 319. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1734 (2017). 
 320. See Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, No. 17-CV-06064-LHK, 2018 WL 1471939, at *8 
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First Amendment logic hardly suggests that social platforms or applications 
should be any less regulable than privately owned physical spaces.  All 
Packingham really means is that social platforms are not subordinate forums 
within the First Amendment order. 
Reno v. ACLU,322 the 1997 case that extended robust speech protections 
to the internet for the first time, is similarly modest:  it raises online speech 
protections up to the level of offline speech protections, but it does not 
suggest that they go any higher.323  The CDA provisions at issue in Reno 
imposed a heavy age and identity verification requirement on online 
publishers who distributed certain sexually explicit materials that were 
defined as inappropriate for minors.324  The law was overbroad in that it 
encompassed protected nonobscene materials and would have required 
consenting adults to disclose personally identifying materials before viewing 
them.325  It would have been struck down if it had been applied to brick-and-
mortar bookstores.326  The government apparently hoped that the CDA might 
get by under a lenient standard similar to the one applied to broadcast 
media.327  The Court declined the invitation.  But nothing in the opinion 
suggests that online publishers or merchants should enjoy protections beyond 
what they would get offline.328 
c.  Computer Code 
When the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) ordered Apple to unlock 
the encrypted phone of the San Bernardino shooter, the company argued that 
to do so would constitute “compelled speech.”329  Such arguments rarely win 
the day in court, though judges nevertheless take them more seriously than 
they should. 
The theory that computer code is a form of speech dates back to the 
Northern District of California’s 1996 decision in Bernstein v. United States 
Department of State,330 where the judge reckoned that computer 
programming languages should be treated as the equivalent of natural 
languages such as English or German.331  On this theory, statements 
communicated in code deserve the same formidable battery of First 
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Amendment protections as statements communicated in a natural 
language.332 
The Bernstein argument has had very little practical effect.  Academics 
who wanted to use computer code for illustrative purposes have won 
victories.333  But in cases about actual consumer-grade software, courts have 
consistently used a watered-down First Amendment analysis to avoid 
following Bernstein’s flawed logic through to its preposterous 
conclusions.334 
2.  The Particular Approach 
There is a simple appeal to an approach that says “video games are 
speech,” or that “social media is speech,” or that software generally is speech.  
But the costs of heightened scrutiny across the board will pile up quickly.  
First Amendment law will eventually have to draw some lines among the 
internet’s various uses and acknowledge that most of them are 
nonexpressive.  It is at this point, after the generalistic approach’s easy 
answers fall away, that courts might begin to evaluate specific aspects of 
addictive design on their own First Amendment merits. 
a.  Addictive Design as Conventional Message-Bearing Speech 
At least some of the design elements in question communicate some kind 
of easily articulable message.  When Facebook tells you that you have 
twenty-nine likes, it is telling you that you have twenty-nine likes.  And when 
app icons use stop-sign red dots to get your attention, the message is:  “Hey!  
Over here!” 
But messages should not be dismissed as eligible First Amendment content 
just because they are austere.335  Even simple commercial solicitations count.  
Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman336 frames “the communication of 
prices,” apart from any surrounding advertising content, as a form of 
speech.337  A New York law that banned credit surcharges but not “cash 
discounts” regulated merchants’ communicative choices in such a way as to 
potentially summon First Amendment protection.338 
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Clip-art-level visual content may also incline a court toward extending 
protection to certain elements of interface design.  In a recent case, Candy 
Lab Inc. v. Milwaukee County,339 the Eastern District of Wisconsin extended 
protection to Texas Rope ‘Em, a Pokémon Go–like scavenger hunt in which 
users travel to real world locations to collect cards that the player could add 
to a hand of poker.340  Despite the game’s lack of the “plot, character or 
dialogue” elements that made the difference in Brown, the court found 
protected content in the “Western-themed virtual environment, complete 
with a Texas-themed game title, color scheme, and graphics, allowing the 
player to corral favorable playing cards using an animated lasso.”341 
Courts analyzing video gambling machines, on the other hand, have been 
less generous.  “[M]erely stat[ing] whether a player has won a prize by 
displaying a depiction of, for instance, three cherries,” has been held 
insufficient for First Amendment protection.342  It is unclear what accounts 
for the difference between the three cherries and the simple “Wild West” 
images in Texas Rope ‘Em.  It may have less to do with the “speechiness” of 
these images as such and more to do with an unspoken decision to lay off the 
First Amendment where gambling is concerned.343 
b.  Addictive Design as Abstract Expression 
Other addictive design techniques cannot be said to convey any message 
at all.  These elements—such as the “infinite scroll” of your News Feed, the 
“pull to refresh” capability of your podcasting app, or the flashing lights and 
sounds that intensify the ritual of opening a loot box—fit even less easily into 
the First Amendment domain than the clip-art-level expression of Texas Rope 
‘Em.  But the Supreme Court has stressed that a clear and particularized 
message is not necessary to invoke constitutional protection. 
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 
Inc.,344 a touchstone in discussions about abstract expression, the Court 
upheld a parade organizer’s right to exclude a gay and lesbian organization 
from marching in a St. Patrick’s Day festival.345  The state’s public 
accommodation law generally prohibited discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation—conduct that in most instances is not considered 
expressive for First Amendment purposes—and it was unclear what message, 
if any, the parade organizer intended to send.  But Justice David Souter wrote 
for the Court that “a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition 
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of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a 
‘particularized message,’ would never reach the unquestionably shielded 
painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky 
verse of Lewis Carroll.”346 
Developers may argue that much of what makes addictive design work 
rests within this zone of sensory abstraction.  Notification badges are more 
effective in bold colors—red in particular—and in certain organizations of 
physical space.347  Many apps and games put on little productions for the 
purpose of building suspense before user events.  When a Twitter user “pulls 
down” to see recent tweets, the top of the screen shows a short animation.  
Loot boxes in video games put on a more elaborate show.  The box typically 
sits isolated in an austere, empty space and begins to quake.  It then explodes 
open with a blinding flash accompanied by noises and music.  Stars or 
confetti fly into the air, and finally the user’s new in-game items are 
revealed.348  What these phenomena lack in an articulable message, they 
possess in terms of sheer aesthetic force. 
Such arguments can easily be carried too far, though.  It is significant that 
Justice Souter chose three artists to illustrate his point and that Hurley itself 
arose in the context of a parade.349  Art and parades, however inscrutable 
their meaning, are almost purely expressive phenomena by definition.  Even 
if the expression defies articulation, it is there.  But that is not obviously the 
case for abstract design choices—say, stripes on wallpaper—that do not 
occur within the context of some kind of expressive work.  To extend 
Hurley’s protection to images generally, sounds generally, or UX design 
generally, would disregard the possibility of nonrepresentational meaning—
a critical distinguishing feature of art itself. 
One reason to protect Pollock’s work despite its nonrepresentational nature 
would be to say that the choice not to represent any particular subject matter 
is itself meaningful.  In this respect, any public decision to withhold 
protections from work that “doesn’t depict anything” or “that my three-year-
old could draw” would discriminate not only in terms of content, but along 
even more troubling lines of taste and culture.350 
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As for instrumental music, it may often carry clear national, ethnic, or 
cultural messaging that no liberal society has any business prohibiting.  And 
where the message is harder to discern—say in the work of John Cage or the 
noise artist Merzbow, any attempt to suppress that kind of material would 
reflect a troubling authoritarian concern with suppressing cultural 
subversion.351 
Red badges, infinite scrolls, and other nonrepresentational features of the 
consumer interface lie far outside these concerns, which makes it hard to say 
that elements of UI design should command any degree of First Amendment 
coverage on their own intrinsic merits.  A more persuasive theory would hold 
that these aspects of design receive protection because of their attention-
grabbing or attention-holding role—their monetizing role—in relation to 
products that are expressive for other reasons.352 
c.  Addictive Design as an Auxiliary to Speech 
The instinct that habit-forming design techniques intersect with First 
Amendment coverage is understandable.  Yet it is hard to give any persuasive 
account for why most gamification tricks—badges, loot boxes, infinite 
scrolls, streaks, and so on—should count either as speech or as the sort of 
content that cannot be burdened without triggering strict scrutiny.  There is 
no good reason to say that either software, the internet, social platforms, 
video games, or other “gamified” applications should be treated as pure 
speech.  And even if some design techniques—the two-second pyrotechnics 
display that occurs when a loot box opens, for instance—might be viewed as 
speech standing alone, techniques such as YouTube’s autoplay function or 
Twitter’s pull-to-refresh design are hard to rationalize as First Amendment 
material.  The best that can be said for them is that they sit adjacent to the 
real expression—the “literary and dramatic elements” in video games, the 
conversations about life, news and culture within social media, and so on. 
This is not to say that adjacent is a bad place to be.  First, the addictive UX 
in social media and video games helps to monetize the content.353  If 
engagement suffers on Facebook, Facebook’s ability to deliver core speech 
suffers as well.  And the same is true for video games that are financed largely 
or entirely through advertising or microtransactions.  Any restriction against 
the use of some addictive design technique—say, autoplay—would 
presumably burden speech financially.  If that burden applies on a content-
discriminatory basis—as if educational video platforms were permitted to 
use autoplay but others were not—then strict scrutiny should apply.354  But 
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as long as a law regulated autoplay across the board, without respect to the 
content of the video or the identity or message or viewpoint of the platform, 
then a law regulating autoplay should probably be considered akin to a time, 
place, and manner restriction calling for relatively deferential review. 
Second, and more broadly, there might be prophylactic reasons not to 
allow regulation of design components that are bound up so closely with 
expressive subject matter.  Loot boxes sit alongside fully protected literary 
and dramatic content that should not be disturbed.  Autoplay is sewn into 
YouTube and Netflix, the new century’s answer to broadcast media.355  Even 
if certain design elements are only doubtfully expressive, courts may choose 
to err on the side of caution in light of the design elements’ close association 
with material that is clearly expressive.  But practically speaking, the 
protective buffer can only extend so far if courts are to avoid the Lochner-
like absurdities that would follow from wholesale constitutional protection 
for tech. 
B.  Degrees of Scrutiny 
So far, this Article has addressed only the basic question of whether the 
First Amendment is in play at all when the government regulates addictive 
design.  But in those cases where the First Amendment does come into play, 
it will become necessary to determine how far the Constitution’s protections 
extend.  Here lie the usual black-letter questions about the appropriate level 
of scrutiny, the adequacy of the means-end fit, and so on. 
This Article discusses a couple of doctrinal details that can be made out 
today, but the likely state of the doctrine over the next decade or so is too 
fluid to speak with precision.  The Supreme Court’s almost limitless view of 
the reach of “speech,” together with its determination to apply strict scrutiny 
to every form of content regulation, is plainly unsustainable within an 
economy and society that is increasingly built around information both as an 
economic resource and as an apparatus of industrial control.356  To date, 
courts have not formulated a clear and workable theory to describe software’s 
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place in the universe of First Amendment speech, let alone worked out a 
doctrinal framework. 
One point is relatively clear today, and that is that certain modest efforts 
to regulate habit-forming apps can probably slide in under rational basis 
review.  This is for two reasons.  First, the First Amendment’s protections for 
commercial speech do not extend to deceptive advertising.357  Second, the 
Court has allowed the government to require product labeling where doing 
so is reasonably related to the goal of preventing consumer deception.358  
When the government requires advertising content to consist of “purely 
factual and uncontroversial information,” the Court has held that those 
requirements are not “unjustified or unduly burdensome.”359 
Above, this Article suggested that near-term regulatory efforts may 
include a crackdown on aggressive monetization in children’s products.360  
Under their authority to police deceptive practices, the FTC or similar state-
level agencies could push developers either to remove certain habit-forming 
features from children’s products or to attach warning labels for parents.361  
At least some of these measures should be able to avoid heightened scrutiny 
altogether even assuming that the First Amendment covers the app in 
question. 
Beyond this point, however, the degree of First Amendment protection, if 
any, is wide open.  One aspect of this contingency has to do with the basic 
question discussed above:  whether the design techniques under regulatory 
scrutiny constitute speech for First Amendment purposes and, if they do, on 
what basis?  The answers in this area will inform the question not only of 
whether the regulation of addictive UX design brings the First Amendment 
into play at all, but also of whether that regulation should count as truly 
content discriminatory or not.  If a loot box is considered “speech,” then a 
loot box ban is content discriminatory.  If a loot box is not considered 
“speech,” on the other hand, then a ban on loot boxes may be considered a 
content-neutral burden on video games that profit from loot boxes. 
And it may well turn out that the Court determines the level of scrutiny 
based on broader equities rather than the formal divide between content-
based and content-neutral regulation.  Most of the Supreme Court had an easy 
time applying the formal approach, and ultimately strict scrutiny, in a low-
stakes case involving the ill counsels of violent video games.362  But in cases 
involving international terrorism or even “speech advocating drug use,” even 
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today’s highly speech-protective Court has shown itself startlingly capable 
of inventing new and more deferential tests.363  If a strong consensus emerges 
that behavioral manipulation by big tech constitutes a serious threat to the 
public, then the Court’s First Amendment doctrine may adapt to that 
consensus in unpredictable ways. 
The level of scrutiny will depend still more broadly on the long-term status 
of tech platforms and computing within the constitutional order.  The issues 
here are important enough to public policy and challenging enough to 
existing doctrine that it would not be surprising to witness a period of deep 
doctrinal modification at the Supreme Court over the coming decades. 
Today, tech platforms call on the First Amendment and its statutory 
adjunct, § 230 of the CDA, as a regulatory shelter.364  It seems clear that this 
shelter is beginning to weaken.  In 2018, Congress qualified § 230 for the 
first time in the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act,365 a law that holds 
platforms liable for knowingly assisting, facilitating, or supporting sex 
trafficking.366  And on the First Amendment front, it becomes harder every 
year to maintain the posture that computing and the internet consist either 
entirely or even mostly of expressive activity.  It will not be long before 
courts are forced to mark off certain nonexpressive uses of information as 
either unprotected or less protected. 
It is even possible that some app developers and online platforms may face 
a total reversal of fortune with respect to free speech law and norms.  If the 
legal and policy communities come to view the largest online platforms as 
de facto regulators of speech and society, then courts may constitutionalize 
their activities through some modification of the state action doctrine.  Or, as 
this Article’s author has urged in a previous paper, courts may allow 
government extra room to ensure that these private regulators protect civil 
rights and liberties.367  The effect in either case would be to put big tech on 
the back foot and to give government a free hand. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has focused mainly on developers’ efforts, through applied 
behavioral science, to maximize time on device by encouraging users to form 
habits.  But note that habit-forming design represents only a crude application 
of a wider technology of behavioral manipulation that grows more 
sophisticated every year. 
It is too indirect to say that Facebook and Google monetize their products 
by “placing ads.”  It is better to say that these firms’ actual “product” consists 
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in the ability to raise the odds that a targeted consumer will perform a desired 
action following a behavioral cue.  At some point, through pervasive 
surveillance and conditioning and visual stimuli embedded in users’ contact 
lenses,368 some tech developers may become so good at raising the odds of a 
purchase that probability approaches certainty and persuasion approaches 
control.  As the always PR-challenged Boundless Mind (formerly Dopamine 
Labs) boasts in their own promotional materials, “we’ve built a Skinner box 
more powerful than anything B.F. [Skinner] himself could have imagined in 
his wildest dreams.”369 
Even now, after all of the criticism that has been leveled against big tech, 
the basic threat to freedom and dignity has received relatively little public 
attention.370  But the issue is simply too immense to ignore forever.  There 
will eventually be calls to impose some restraints on overreaching platforms, 
and to extend some shelter to objectors who wish to disconnect from the 
behaviorist machine.  Doing so will involve deep political, practical, and 
most likely constitutional difficulty.  By taking habit-forming design 
seriously, as a legitimate subject matter for public concern and later for public 
regulation, we can begin to develop the social capacity to confront those 
challenges skillfully. 
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